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A lack of CEO succession planning increases business risk as disruption is more likely 
during a CEO transition. One difficulty of examining the importance of CEO succession 
planning is that the planning process is difficult to observe and evaluate. The main 
purposes of this dissertation are two-fold. First is to investigate whether CEO succession 
planning matters by comparing disruption costs in firms with planned departure and those 
with unexpected CEO departures due to death and illness. The second purpose is to 
investigate whether inside or outside directors improve organizational resiliency using the 
context of sudden CEO departures when CEO succession planning is not possible and the 
former CEO is not available for consultation. Using a unique hand-collected data set of 
CEO turnovers from 1996 to 2009, I find evidence that firms with unexpected CEO 
departures have significantly shorter lead time and greater disruption costs, compared to 
firms with planned CEO departures. Specifically, shorter lead time is associated with less 
favorable cumulative stock performance and greater reduction in capital expenditure 
around the incumbent CEO’s departure. These results may indicate that a lack of CEO 
succession planning is associated with greater disruption costs. In fact, a lack of 
succession planning could cost firms approximately $136 million if the incumbent CEO 
departs unexpectedly. In addition, firms with both inside directors other than the CEO 
and well-connected outside directors are most resilient, whereas firms with neither non-
CEO inside directors nor connected outside directors are least resilient and suffer the 
most. In addition, firms with greater inside director presence are less likely to engage in 
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CEO succession planning is the process by which the board of directors prepares 
for the transition of leadership from one CEO to the next. It is cited as one of the most 
important yet challenging roles of the board (Biggs, 2004). A lack of CEO succession 
planning is disruptive and increases business risk. Furthermore, this disruption in 
business activities creates costs that adversely affect shareholder wealth (Vancil 1987). 
The perceived importance of CEO succession planning is underscored by the new SEC 
rule (SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14E, 2009), which recommends firms to include a CEO 
succession planning proposal in their proxy statements. Despite the apparent importance 
of CEO succession planning, literature on its necessity and process during the transition 
has been scarce, possibly because firms are hesitant to disclose detailed succession 
planning information.  
There are two papers in my dissertation. The purpose of the first paper is two-
fold. First, I examine whether CEO succession planning matters. Second, I investigate 
which actions board of directors take to prepare for the transition. Because the succession 
planning process is difficult to observe, I use lead time – the time between the incumbent 
CEO’s departure announcement and the actual departure date to proxy the possibility of 
succession planning. Specifically, I examine whether firms with planned CEO departures 
(i.e., through retirement) have longer lead time and lower disruption costs compared to 
firms with unexpected CEO departures (i.e., due to death, illness, and sudden 
resignation). Presumably, firms with planned CEO retirement will have time to make 
changes to their board in preparation for the succession, resulting in a smoother transition 
and lower disruption costs. By contrast, firms with unexpected CEO departures may not 
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have time to make adjustments to their boards, leading them to experience greater 
disruption costs. Albeit not a perfect measure for the actual length or depth of the 
succession planning process, I argue that lead time is a close proxy for the likelihood of 
succession planning in that it allows firms to compose a succession plan even if there is 
none in place.  
The purpose of the second paper is to investigate whether certain board 
characteristics are related to a firm’s resilience by examining sudden CEO departures, 
when CEO succession planning is not possible. Understanding the relation between board 
composition and a firm’s ability to quickly recover from shocks such as a sudden CEO 
departure is important in understanding a firm’s ability to manage risk. Specifically, I 
examine whether non-CEO inside directors improve a firm’s ability to quickly recover 
from a sudden loss in executive leadership. Inside directors may possess superior firm 
specific knowledge and experience which may allow firms to recover from shocks more 
quickly. For instance, inside directors may be better able to assume the role of CEO in 
either a permanent role for a quick recovery or in a temporary role to provide stability 
during the search for a new CEO. Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) indicate that 
it is less costly for firms to replace a CEO with an internal candidate, and thus, firms only 
choose external candidates when they are superior. Moreover, Masulis and Mobbs (2009) 
suggest that inside directors can provide higher quality internal candidates. In contrast, 
too many inside directors on a firm’s board is often associated with ineffective boards 
and entrenchment.  
I further examine whether outside directors with numerous connections enhance a 
firm’s resilience, or mitigate the costs associated with sudden CEO departures. Coles, 
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Daniel, and Naveen, and Omer, Shelley, and Tice (2012) indicate that outside directors 
may add value through their networks. Thus, well-connected outside directors may be 
better able to quickly identify through their networks highly qualified replacements to 
lead the recovery. In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that outside directors 
sitting on numerous boards are too busy to effectively fulfill their responsibilities as 
directors. In this case, outside directors may quickly choose replacements through their 
connections, but the replacements may not be well qualified to lead a recovery. 
I find evidence that firms with unexpected CEO departures have significantly 
shorter lead time and greater disruption costs, compared to firms with planned CEO 
departures. Specifically, shorter lead time is associated with less favorable cumulative 
stock performance and greater reduction in capital expenditure around the incumbent 
CEO’s departure. These results may indicate that a lack of CEO succession planning is 
associated with greater disruption costs. In fact, a lack of succession planning could cost 
firms approximately $136 million if the incumbent CEO departs unexpectedly. In 
addition, firms with both inside directors other than the CEO and well-connected outside 
directors are most resilient, whereas firms with neither non-CEO inside directors nor 
connected outside directors are least resilient and suffer the most. In addition, firms with 
greater inside director presence are less likely to engage in big bath accounting, i.e., 
taking advantage of the departure to largely write off assets.   
This dissertation contributes to the CEO succession planning literature by 
investigating whether and how CEO succession planning matters. To my knowledge, this 
is the first study to use lead time as a proxy for succession planning and to compare firms 
with planned versus unexpected CEO departures in order to evaluate the importance of 
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CEO succession planning. This comparison permits to determine whether a longer lead 
time reduces or offsets disruption costs associated with CEO succession planning. To my 
knowledge, this paper is also the first to examine the actions firms make to their boards to 
prepare for the transition of power prior to a CEO departure.  
The findings in this dissertation are of particular importance in light of the new 
SEC requirement regarding CEO succession planning (see SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14E, 
2009). Indeed, survey data
1
 reveals a surprisingly lack of preparedness for top leadership 
transitions in US companies. For instance, only about half (51%) of survey respondents 
could name a permanent successor if needed, and 39% reported that they had zero viable 
internal candidates. If CEO succession matters, perhaps firms need to be better prepared 
and have a succession plan in place to ensure a smoother transition. My findings show 
that longer lead time in CEO succession planning is highly related to lower disruption 
costs, and lend support to the new SEC requirement. CEO succession planning should, 
indeed, be a core board responsibility, along with conventional roles such as 









                                                 
1 Hendrick and Struggle 2010 survey on CEO succession planning of 140 CEOs and directors of North 





















































A lack of CEO succession planning increases business risk as disruption is more likely 
during a CEO transition (Vancil 1987). In October 2009, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E regarding 14a-8(i)(7), which 
fully elevated CEO succession planning to the status of a core board responsibility, along 
with conventional roles such as compensation, governance, and auditing. One difficulty 
of examining the importance of CEO succession planning is that the planning process is 
difficult to observe and evaluate. The main purpose of this paper is to use lead time (the 
number of days between the incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement date and their 
actual departure date) to proxy the possibility of CEO succession planning, and to 
investigate whether CEO succession planning matters by comparing disruption costs in 
firms with planned departure and those with unexpected CEO departures due to death and 
illness. Using a unique hand-collected data set of 919 CEO turnovers from 1999 to 2008, 
I find evidence that firms with unexpected CEO departures have significantly shorter lead 
time and greater disruption costs, compared to firms with planned CEO departures. 
Specifically, shorter lead time is associated with less favorable cumulative stock 
performance and greater reduction in capital expenditure around the incumbent CEO’s 
departure. These results indicate that a lack of CEO succession planning is associated 
with greater disruption costs. In fact, a lack of succession planning could cost firms 



















CEO succession planning is the process by which the board of directors prepares 
for the transition of leadership from one CEO to the next. It is cited as one of the most 
important yet challenging roles of the board (Biggs, 2004). A lack of CEO succession 
planning is disruptive and increases business risk. Furthermore, this disruption in 
business activities creates costs that adversely affect shareholder wealth (Vancil 1987). 
The perceived importance of CEO succession planning is underscored by the new SEC 
recommendation (SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14E, 2009), which encourages firms to 
include a CEO succession planning proposal in their proxy statements. 
Despite the apparent importance of CEO succession planning, literature on its 
necessity and process during the transition has been scarce, possibly because firms are 
hesitant to disclose detailed succession planning information. Consider for instance the 
recent change in leadership at Ford Motor Co. When announcing that Mark Field will 
succeed Allan Mulally as new Chief Executive Officer, Ford’s spokeswoman mentioned 
that the “company takes succession planning very seriously and has succession plans in 
place for each of the key leadership positions. However, for competitive reasons, Ford 
does not discuss succession plans externally”
2
. This example highlights how difficult it 
can be for researchers to investigate whether and how CEO succession planning matters, 
mainly because the planning process is difficult to observe and evaluate. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I examine whether CEO succession 
planning matters. Second, I investigate which actions board of directors take to prepare 
for the transition. Because the succession planning process is difficult to observe, I use 
                                                 




lead time – the time between the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement and the 
actual departure date to proxy for succession planning. Specifically, I examine whether 
firms with planned CEO departures (i.e., through retirement) have longer lead time and 
lower disruption costs compared to firms with unexpected CEO departures (i.e., due to 
death, illness, and sudden resignation). Presumably, firms with planned CEO retirement 
will have time to make changes to their board in preparation for the succession, resulting 
in a smoother transition and lower disruption costs. By contrast, firms with unexpected 
CEO departures may not have time to make adjustments to their boards, leading them to 
experience greater disruption costs. Albeit not a perfect measure for the actual length or 
depth of the succession planning process, I argue that lead time is a close proxy for the 
likelihood of succession planning in that it allows firms to compose a succession plan 
even if there is none in place.  
A few papers have attempted to investigate the importance of CEO succession 
planning by examining shareholder reactions during heir apparent successions. For 
instance, Behn, Riley Jr. and Yang (2005) examine whether shareholders value firms 
with a succession plan in place. Specifically, they use whether firms have an heir 
apparent (i.e. an officer holding the title of COO and/or President and is at least five years 
younger than the incumbent CEO) as a proxy for succession planning and investigate 
shareholder reactions at the announcement of a sudden CEO death. The authors find that 
the cumulative announcement returns on the date of death are higher in firms with an heir 
apparent successor. The major difference between my paper and Behn et al. (2005) is that 
I use a much cleaner proxy for succession by hand collecting firms with a clear indication 
of planned CEO departure. The issue with using general CEO turnover event to examine 
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the importance of CEO succession planning is that shareholder reactions are impacted by 
the cause of turnovers. For instance, after a forced CEO turnover, it will be difficult to 
disentangle whether shareholders react positively because the company may have a 
succession plan in place or because it fired an incompetent CEO.  
 A CEO departure is categorized as a planned departure if the incumbent CEO’s 
departure announcement contains key terms indicating that the departure is part of an 
orderly transition of power.
3
  Unexpected CEO departures, by contrast, may include 
departures due to sudden death, illness, or resignation. I used three measures to proxy 
disruption costs: (1) one-, two-, and three-month cumulative market-adjusted stock 
returns; (2) change in sales scaled by sales the year prior to departure; and (3) change in 
capital expenditure scaled by sales the year prior to departure. Change in sales and 
change in capital expenditure are measured up to three years after the incumbent CEOs’ 
actual departure date. 
My sample consists of 919 CEO departures, including 843 planned and 76 
unexpected CEO departures, during the period of 1999 to 2008. I find that firms with 
unexpected departures have significantly shorter lead time than those with planned CEO 
departures. They also have significantly more negative excess stock returns during a 90-
day period. Within the planned departure subsample, firms with above-median lead time 
experience significantly lower disruption costs and a smoother transition. Specifically, 
while there is no difference in the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns within 3 
                                                 
3
 Key words indicating an orderly transition of power include, but are not limited to: “succession”, 
“succession planning”, “succession plan”, “natural transition”, “retirement age”, “retirement”, and “orderly 
transition of power”.  
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months of the transition, firms with above-median lead time have significantly more 
favorable change in sales after the departure.  
 When examining the changes directors make to their firm, and to their board, in 
anticipation of the CEO departure, I find that firms with planned departures typically do 
two things. First of all, they are more likely to use relay successions with an heir 
apparent—typically the COO and/or president (Canalla and Shen 2001, Shen and Canalla 
Jr. 2003, Zhang and Rajagopalan 2004, Behn, Riley Jr. and Yang 2005). Specifically, the 
heir apparent is appointed as COO and/or president approximately two years (692 days) 
before the planned departure. The new CEO candidates typically are appointed to the 
board two to three years in advance in those firms with planned departure. Such findings 
are consistent with prior literature that posits that when a CEO nears retirement, the 
potential successor is “groomed” as the COO and/or president, while joining the board to 
facilitate the succession (Mace 1971, Vancil 1987, Hermalin and Waisbacj 1988). 
Second, new CEOs are appointed to the board as part of the succession planning. In the 
planned departure subsample, more than two-third (35.7%) of the new CEOs joined the 
board two years prior, and nearly 50% of the new CEOs joined the board one year prior 
to the transition.  
On the other hand, there is no evidence of “grooming” or “preparing” in firms 
with unexpected CEO departures. Not only are these firms less likely to use relay 
successions, but also should a COO or president be promoted to CEO after an unexpected 
departure, data shows that they have been in the COO/president position for at least four 
years prior to the departure. Additionally, new CEOs have significantly longer board 
tenure, and nearly 90% of them have been a director for at least three years prior to the 
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incumbent CEO’s departure. These findings suggest that, when faced with an unexpected 
CEO departure when there is no time for succession planning, firms tend to appoint a 
successor with lengthy firm and board experience to weather the storm. 
This paper contributes to the CEO succession planning literature by investigating 
whether and how CEO succession planning matters. To my knowledge, this is the first 
study to use lead time as a proxy for succession planning and to compare firms with 
planned versus unexpected CEO departures in order to evaluate the importance of CEO 
succession planning. This comparison permits to determine whether a longer lead time 
reduces or offsets disruption costs associated with CEO succession planning. To my 
knowledge, this paper is also the first to examine the actions firms make to their boards to 
prepare for the transition of power prior to a CEO departure. My findings indicate that the 
new CEO candidate is more likely to be the designated successor and usually appointed 
to the board approximately two years in advance prior to the planned departure to smooth 
transition. 
The findings in this paper are of particular importance in light of the new SEC 
requirement regarding CEO succession planning (see SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14E, 
2009). Indeed, survey data
4
 reveals a surprisingly lack of preparedness for top leadership 
transitions in US companies. For instance, only about half (51%) of survey respondents 
could name a permanent successor if needed, and 39% reported that they had zero viable 
internal candidates. If CEO succession matters, perhaps firms need to be better prepared 
and have a succession plan in place to ensure a smoother transition. My findings show 
                                                 
4 Hendrick and Struggle 2010 survey on CEO succession planning of 140 CEOs and directors of North 




that a lack of succession planning could cost firms approximately $136 million if the 
incumbent CEO departs unexpectedly, therefore lend support to the new SEC 
recommendation. CEO succession planning should, indeed, be elevated to a core aspect 
of a firm’s corporate governance regime. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior 
literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics. Section 4 presents univariate and multivariate results using 
unexpected CEO departures. Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion. 
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Importance of CEO succession planning 
Since it is difficult to disentangle whether firms have a succession planning in 
place or not, existing literature on the importance of succession planning has mainly 
focused on shareholder reactions and changes in firm performance around the 
sudden/unexpected death of the CEO or other senior managers. Studies as early as 
Johnson, Magee, Nagrajan, and Newman (1985) examine the relationship between CEO 
death and shareholder wealth through announcement returns. They find that senior 
executive sudden death may have different impact on shareholder wealth, depending 
upon the characteristics of employment relationship of the passing and replacing 
executives. The net excess return is positively associated with the passing of a founder 
CEO, and negatively associated with the passing executive’s position other than founder 
in the company. 
Worrell, Davidson III, Chandy and Garrison (1986) attempt to investigate the 
consequence of senior executive turnover by examining announcement returns of death. 
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They find that shareholders are indifferent towards general senior executive death, but 
react negatively if the CEO died, if death is sudden, and if founder died. And they react 
positively towards chairman death (chairmen in their sample were in the age of 70s, 80s, 
and 90s). 
Behn, Dawley, Riley and Yang (2006) find that delay in appointing a successor 
after unexpected senior executive death is associated with decreasing operating 
performance, measured by change in sales, change in income before extraordinary items 
scaled by sales, calculated over one-year and two-year period, and lower cumulative 
returns around the death of the CEO.  In a more recent paper, Salas 2010 argues that 
stock price reaction towards senior executive sudden death could be a proxy of 
entrenchment. Positive shareholder reaction may indicate death removed entrenched 
management, yet negative reaction may indicate the passing of a highly effective and 
hard to replace executive.  
In general, these studies find that sudden/unexpected CEO departures are 
detrimental to shareholder wealth. When faced with sudden/unexpected CEO departures, 
firms and their boards may not have sufficient time to compose a succession plan, hence 
experience higher disruption costs reflected by negative shareholder reactions. I predict 
that firms with planned departure may experience lower disruption costs partially proxied 
by short-term cumulative market-adjusted stock performance. 
2.2. Succession type and outcome 
 Prior literature categorizes CEO succession into relay, horse race, or outside 
succession based on whether there exists an heir apparent successor (Canalla and Shen 
2001, Shen and Canalla Jr. 2003, Zhang and Rajagopalan 2004, Behn, Riley Jr. and Yang 
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2005). A firm is identified to have an heir apparent if an executive is holding the title of 
COO and/or president. Behn et al. (2005) uses heir apparent successor to proxy for CEO 
succession planning, and find that shareholders react less negatively at the announcement 
of sudden CEO death if firms have identified an heir apparent. The authors then argue 
that CEO succession planning seems to add value to companies engaged in the transition 
of power. 
Shen and Cannella Jr (2003A) find that shareholders prefer heir succession to 
non-heir inside succession. In addition, outside successions are associated with poorer 
firm performance and positive announcement returns, reflecting shareholders’ 
dissatisfaction towards the incumbent CEO and desire for a change in firm management. 
However, the authors recommend that firms carefully select and groom heirs, and 
monitor them first. If firm performance continues to be good, firms should ensure 
promotion. If not, then board of directors should consider outside succession. Shen and 
Cannella Jr (2003B) also specifically examine relay succession. Their findings suggest 
that shareholders prefer relay succession over non-relay succession. Although there is 
insignificant stock price reaction towards the initiation of heir apparent appointment, 
shareholders react positively towards the promotion, and negatively towards the 
departure. Outside succession is also associated with a positive stock price reaction. 
Zhang and Rajaopalan (2004) also find relay succession to add value. 
Specifically, they find that relay succession is associated with higher pre and post 
succession firm performance. However, the more internal candidates in a firm, the lower 
the likelihood of relay succession.  Firms may opt for horse race succession when there 
are more qualified internal candidates. In a more recent paper, Mobbs and Raheja (2012) 
15 
 
argue that succession planning is not one-type-fits-all, compared to tournaments 
promotion (horse race), successor-incentive promotion is associated with higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity to the designated successor. They authors find that relay 
successions are more common in firms or industries where firm specific knowledge is 
more important to the CEO position and where the supply of potential outside CEO 
replacements is limited.  
Overall, firms with a succession plan in place seem more likely to use relay 
successions. I predict that firms with planned departure have longer lead time and are 
more likely to use relay successions. Presumably a longer-lead time may allow firms to 
compose a plan and start grooming an heir apparent, even if there is no plan in place. 
Longer lead time may also allow firms to have lower disruption costs and smoother 
transition. I use long-term (from one year before to three years after the departure) 
industry and performance adjusted operating performance, as well as change in capital 
expenditure to partially proxy disruption costs. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 I use data from eight different sources. I first identify the initial sample of CEO 
departures during the period 1991-2009 from Execucomp, which covers S&P 1500 firms.  
CRSP and Compustat provide stock returns and accounting information. CEO successor 
board experience and corporate governance data are identified through the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Database
5
. Institutional ownership 
information is obtained through Thomson Reuters Institutional Ownership Data. I hand 
                                                 
5 This database is now called Risk Metrics 
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collect data to fill in any observations where CEO appointment date or the date he/she 
joined the company is missing in Execucomp, for the purpose of identifying CEO tenure.  
 The initial sample contains 2,522 CEO departures identified from Execucomp 
during the period of 1991-2009.  I use the fiscal year as unit of time and merge the initial 
sample with CRSP and Compustat, then merge with IRRC Director Database by 
matching each annual shareholder meeting date for a firm with the fiscal year in which 
the meeting is held. I exclude dual class firms and any observations where there was no 
actual succession; for instance, the change of CEO captured is due to the change of their 
last name, but the two observations are actually the same person. After the merging 
process, there were around 2,300 CEO departures during the 1991-2009 period.  
For all 2,300 CEO departures, I use Factiva, Lexis Nexis and proxy statements to 
hand collect the following information: (1) CEO successor origin. This information is 
missing for some observations due to the missing data in Execucomp on the date the 
CEO joined the company. I follow Parrino’s (1997) definition on insider versus outsiders. 
Insiders are successors that have been with the company for at least one year prior to 
becoming CEO; and outsiders are successors that have been with the company for less 
than a year prior to becoming CEO. (2) Interim CEOs. Whether the news release states 
that the successor is an interim or permanent CEO. (3) Cause of departure. I categorize 
the departure of the CEO into natural retirement, forced resignation, unexpected 
departures, M&A activity, restructuring, proxy fight, and the separation of CEO/chairman 
duality. (4) The earliest announcement date of incumbent CEO departure and permanent 
replacement CEO appointment. (5) The actual incumbent CEO departure and new CEO 
takeover date. (6) Whether the replacement CEO has been on the appointing company’s 
17 
 
board of directors at least six months before the appointment announcement. (7) Cause of 
the unexpected departure. Whether the unexpected departure is due to sudden death, 
illness, or is due to incumbent CEO being hired away either by a better company, or 
accepted a government job. (8) Whether the replacement CEO has had CEO experience 
before in other companies. (9) Whether the retiring CEO is the founder of the company, 
and whether the company is a family company. (10) The previous positions held by 
replacement CEOs. 
After collecting data for the whole CEO departure sample, I narrow my focus 
onto planned departures and unexpected CEO departures. A CEO departure is 
categorized as a planned departure if the incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement 
contains key terms indicating that the departure is part of an orderly transition of power. 
The key terms include “succession”, “succession planning”, “succession plan”, “natural 
transition”, “retirement age, “retirement”, “required retirement” and” orderly transition of 
power. A CEO departure is categorized as unexpected when the CEO departure (or 
decision to leave) is neither a result of poor performance, nor of regulatory and/or 
criminal investigation. It should be a genuinely unexpected event. Although a CEO’s 
departure may have come to a surprise to the market, it will not be included in my sample 
if the board was aware of the departure (or decision to leave), or if it was under the 
mutual agreement between the CEO and the board. The final sample consists of 921 CEO 
departures, out of which 843 are planned departure and 78 are unexpected departures 
from 1999 to 2008
6
. 
                                                 
6
 Financial and utility firms are excluded from my sample 
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I used three measures to proxy disruption costs: (1) one-, two-, and three-month 
cumulative market-adjusted stock returns after the departure announcement (2) Change in 
firm performance from one year before to three years after the incumbent CEO departure 
announcement and (3) change in capital expenditure from one year before to three years 
after the departure announcement. I use change in sales scaled by sales the year before 
incumbent CEO’s departure as a measure of performance.  
4. Analysis 
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
4.1.1. CEO departures through time 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 1 shows both planned departure and unexpected CEO departures through 
time from 1999 to 2008. I also tabulate lead time and departing CEO age. There seems to 
be no systematic clustering over time. Both planned and unexpected CEO departures are 
randomly distributed through time. However, there is a fairly strong difference in lead 
time between the two subsamples. On average, firms have a 76-day lead time when the 
incumbent CEO plans to retire; whereas when faced with an unexpected CEO departure, 
firms only have a 3.5-day lead time. In addition to lead time, there is also a difference in 
departing CEO age between the two subsamples. CEOs typically near retirement age 
(reference) of 62-65 in the planned departure subsample. On the other hand, the age of 
CEOs unexpected left the firm ranges from 51 to 75, indicating that unexpected 




4.2. Descriptive statistics in firms with planned departure and unexpected CEO 
departures 
--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-- 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics of firm, departing CEO, and corporate 
governance characteristics on firms with planned departure and unexpected CEO 
departures. There is no systematic difference between the two subsamples except for free 
cash flows. Firms with planned departure have greater Free Cash Flow (4.12% versus 
2.58%) compared to firms with unexpected CEO departures. Prior literature uses Free 
Cash Flow (FCF) as a measure of managerial discretion on the use of internally generated 
cash flows (Jensen 1986, Stulz 1990, Richardson 2006, Chen Chen and Wei 2011).  
Another difference between the two subsamples is the percentage of inside directors. 
Although board size and independence are similar in both samples, firms with planned 
departure have lower percentage of inside directors on board (20.32% versus 22.86%). 
This result indicates that firms with planned departure have a greater presence of 
affiliated/grey directors on board.  
4.3. Comparison of disruption/transitional characteristics between firms with 
planned departure and unexpected CEO departures 
--INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-- 
 Panel A in Table 3 shows the comparison of CEO transitional characteristics 
between firms with planned departure and unexpected CEO departures. The delay 
between incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement date and their actual departure date 
(lead time) is 75 days when the departure is planned. On the other hand, when the 
departure is unexpected due to death, illness, and sudden resignation, the lead time is 
significantly shorter at 3.53 days. This result is consistent with my earlier prediction that 
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firms with planned departure have longer lead time. In addition, new CEO successors are 
identified twice as quickly in firms with planned departure, compared to unexpected 
departures (approximately 15 days versus 30 days). This is an indication that when a 
CEO nears retirement, he/she may have already identified the successor; whereas when a 
CEO unexpected departs, it may take firms longer to find a replacement. Another 
interesting result is that on the same day the incumbent CEO leaves a firm, a new CEO 
will take over, hence the transition time is zero when the retirement is planned in 
advance. However, firms with unexpected CEO departure experience approximately 60 
days without a permanent CEO in place, measured by the difference between days before 
new CEO takeover and lead time.  
 Although lead time proxies the likelihood either CEO succession plan in place or 
succession planning, it may not be an accurate measure for how long firms have been 
succession planning. An alternative measure for the length of succession planning, 
particularly relay succession, is the number of days since the new CEO was appointed as 
a COO and/or President. I hand-collect the date the new CEO was appointed to the 
position of COO and/or President from Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for firms who seemingly 
used relay succession. Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms typically appoint the heir 
apparent to the COO/President position one or two years in advance for “grooming” 
purpose. The two-year period will allow the to-be CEO gain hands-on experience firms’ 
day-to-day operations, and be familiar with the board of directors and other senior 
managers. Consider, for instance, the recent CEO power transition in Ford Motor Co. 
Ford announced on April 21, 2014 that it is to name Mark Field as the new CEO, 
effective on July 1. News release reported “Fields emerged as Mulally’s likely successor 
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when he was promoted to COO in December 2012. Ford had said that Mulally would stay 
through 2014”.
7
 Consistent with Ford Motor’s example, I find that 341(40.45%) 
companies with planned departure used relay succession. The average “grooming period” 
is 692.72 days, approximately two years, before the COO and/or President becomes the 
new CEO. Yet this is not the case in firms with unexpected CEO departures. Not only are 
these firms less likely to use relay succession (28.20%), if a COO/President was 
appointed as the new CEO, their tenure as the COO/President is between three and four 
years. Similarly, the new CEOs have board tenure of 2.8 years in firms with planned 
departure, compared to 7.06 years in those with unexpected CEO departures. These 
findings indicate that when firms are faced with a shock such as the unexpected departure 
of its CEO, they tend to appoint executives who are familiar to operating and have longer 
board tenure to weather the storm. 
 Panel B in Table 3 provides comparison of shareholder reactions at the 
announcement of incumbent CEO departures. I use Eventus to generate cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) three days around the departure announcement using both the 
market model and market adjusted returns (not tabulated). For the cumulative returns up 
to 90 days after the departure announcement, I use valuated market adjusted returns from 
CRSP. Consistent with planning, shareholders react insignificantly at the announcement 
of incumbent CEO retirement, but negatively (p<=0.01) at the announcement of 
unexpected CEO departures. This negative reaction indicates investor uncertainty 
towards the future of a company when its CEO left due to death, illness and sudden 
                                                 




resignation. The differences in shareholder reaction at the departure announcement are 
statistically significant at 1% level between the two subsamples.  
 Panel C in Table 3 shows the comparison of long term change in firm 
performance and firm investment opportunities measured by change in sales and change 
in capital expenditure, respectively. Firms with planned departure have significantly less 
change in sales for up to two years after the year of the actual departure. This is contrary 
to my prediction that firms with planned retirement may have more positive or less 
negative change in sales around the incumbent CEO’s departure. However, this result 
may be caused by the fact that firms with unexpected departures have significantly lower 
sales the year prior to departure, therefore, when scaled, they show a larger change in 
sales compared to firms with planned departure. In the later part of the paper, I show that 
when the departure is planned, firms with above-median lead time have significantly 
greater change in sales. There is no significant difference in change in capital expenditure 
between the two subsamples. 
4.4. Comparison of board adjustments 
--INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-- 
 Based on my earlier assumption that when firms have longer lead time, they may 
be able to compose a succession plan even when there is none in place. In this section, I 
examine board adjustments firms make in order to prepare for succession planning. Table 
4 shows the comparison of board characteristics over a three-year period prior to CEO 
departure in firms with planned departure and unexpected departures. Both firms have 
similar board size and independence, as well as the change in board size and 
independence. From two years to one year before the power transition, both subsamples 
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experience an increase in existing director turnover, possibly caused by the shift in board 
composition, when firms start putting the successor on board. Specifically, 28.23% of the 
CEO successor joined the board at least three years before the planned departure, and 
nearly half of the new CEOs have board tenure of at least one year before they pick up 
the baton in firms with planned departure; where as almost all new CEOs have been on 
the board for at least three years before an unexpected CEO departure. The new CEO 
board tenure differences between the two subsamples are economically and statistically 
significant. This result demonstrates that when firms have a succession plan in place or in 
progress, appointing the new CEO to the board at least two years in advance may be part 
of the actions firms make to the board in anticipation of the transition of power. 
4.5. Comparison of above and below median lead time in the subsample of firms 
with planned departure 
In the previous analysis, I compared firms with planned departure and unexpected 
CEO departure. I find that firms with planned departure have longer lead time and lower 
disruption costs. In this section, I focus on planned departure and compare firms with 
above and below median lead time. The purpose of this comparison is to investigate 
within planned departure, whether firms with longer lead time have similar disruption 
costs and make similar adjustment to the board with firms with shorter lead time. The 
median lead time in firms with planned departure is 34 days, and out of the 843 
retirements, 420 have above-, and 423 have below-median lead time. Table 5 Panel A 
shows the descriptive statistics and comparison in firm, departing CEO and corporate 
governance characteristics for both subsamples. There seems to be a difference between 
firms with longer (above median) and shorter (below median) lead time. Specifically, 
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firms with longer lead time are larger and older firms with higher institutional investors 
and lower stock price volatility the prior fiscal year. In addition, they have larger boards 
with greater board independence and are more clustered in the post 2001 period. They 
also have better connected outside directors and lower percentage of departing founder 
CEOs. Notice that it is not the intention of this paper to examine the determinants of 
longer or shorter lead time. The focus of this paper is to investigate whether longer lead 
time is associated with a smoother transition. 
--INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE-- 
Panel B in Table 5 shows the comparison of CEO transitional characteristics in 
firms with above or below median lead time (34 days). The average lead time in the 
above median subsample is 142 days and 9 days in the below median subsample. 
Although there is a dramatic difference in lead time, both subsamples experience very 
short period of no CEO in place (difference between days in new CEO takeover and lead 
time). However, firms with longer lead time are more likely to use relay successions and 
are more likely to appoint an insider, or an existing director as the new permanent CEO, 
which is consistent with succession planning. 
Both subsamples have insignificant abnormal returns around the announcement 
dates of planned departures. This result may indicate that investors have been aware of 
the upcoming retirement and the stock price incorporated this information. However, 
there is a significant difference in firms’ long-term performance and capital expenditure 
between the two subsamples. Panel D in Table 5 shows the differences. In particular, 
firms with above-median lead time have significantly more favorable change in industry-
and-performance adjusted ROAs for up to two year after the year of retirement. The 
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mean differences in change in performance are 1.29% and 1.08%, respectively, and are 
both economically and statistically significant.  
4.6. Board adjustments made by firms with above or below-median lead time 
--INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 6 shows the potential board adjustment up to three year prior to the planned 
departure in firms with above or below median lead time. The purpose of this comparison 
is to examine whether firms with longer lead time plan for succession differently from 
firms with shorter lead time. Similar to the comparison between planned and unexpected 
CEO departures, firms with longer lead time start decreasing existing director turnover 
from three to two years, possibly to reduce director turnover costs and to prepare for 
succession.  In addition, a greater proportion of new CEOs were appointed to the board at 
least one year in advance when firms have longer lead time. On the contrary, firms with 
shorter lead time experience an increase of existing director turnover over the same 
period, and have lower proportion of the new CEOs appointed to the board. In summary, 
board tenure of at least one year seems to be desirable as part of the succession planning 
process.  
5. Multivariate analysis 
 
5.1. Cumulative abnormal stock returns after the incumbent CEOs’ actual 
departure date 
--INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE-- 
Univariate analysis does not control for other factors that could impact the change 
in performance. In this section, I extend my analysis to a multivariate setting. I rely on 
related prior studies, for instance, Yermack (1996), Naveen (2006), Coles et al. (2008), 
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and Coles et al. (2012), for guidance in selecting control variables. Table 7 shows the 
multivariate analysis results on the cumulative abnormal stock returns 30, 60, 90, and 360 
days after the incumbent CEOs’ actual departure date. The cumulative returns are 
calculated using market-adjusted model. I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
with the White Robustness Error, controlling for firm, corporate governance, and 
departing CEO characteristics. The dependent variables are all in percentage format. 
The result shows that ceteris paribus, unexpected CEO departures are associated 
with significantly negative CARs. Specifically, a change from planned departure to 
unexpected departure decreases the CARs (0,0),  CARs (-1,1), and CARs (-3,3) by 
1.77%, 2.97%, and 3.40%, respectively. Furthermore, it decreases the excess stock 
returns within a 30-day priod after the departure by 5.99%. 
5.2. Change in firm performance 
--INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 8 shows the multivariate analysis results on change in firm performance 
around the fiscal year of the actual departure date. The dependent variable in columns (1) 
to (6) is the change in sales from one year before to three years after the actual departure. 
I control for whether firms unexpectedly lost its CEO, whether firms used a horse race 
succession, as well as whether a firms have above or below median lead time, in addition 
to other firm and corporate governance variables. The coefficients are estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with the White robustness error. Columns (1), (3), and (5) 
do not include any interaction terms, and columns (2), (4), and (6) take into consideration 
of the interaction between unexpected departure and horse race succession. The 
dependent variables are all in percentage format.  
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The results show that an unexpected departures decreases change in sales by 
2.15%, but this impact only shows up three years after the incumbent CEO’s departure. 
In addition, firms with above median lead time have greater change in sales from one 
year before to up to three years after the departure. Specially, a change from having 
below to above median lead time increases the change in sales by 6.70%, 6.00%, and 
8.40%, respectively. This result indicates that firms with longer lead time may be better 
preparing/prepared for the CEO transition, therefore have better change in firm 
performance. As mentioned in the earlier part of this paper, although lead time may not 
be an accurate measure of the length or depth of succession planning, it proxies for the 
likelihood of succession planning, and firms with longer lead time are more likely to have 
a succession in place or compose one. The interaction between unexpected CEO 
departure and horse race succession is not significantly related to change in sales.  
5.3. Change in capital expenditure 
--INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 9 shows the results of the coefficients using OLS regression with the White 
robustness errors. The dependent variables are changes in CAPEX from one year before 
to three years after the departure. The multivariate results show that unexpected CEO 
departures are associated with decreases in change in CAPEX for at least three years after 
the CEO departure. A change from planned to unexpected CEO departure decreases 
CAPEX by 3.42%, 1.97% and 3.92% from one year to three years after the departure, 
respectively. An interesting result is that horse race succession seems to be associated 
with a disruption of capital expenditure. Specifically, when firms use horse race 
succession, change in CapEx decreases approximately 3-4% from one year before to 
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three years after the departure. This result may be an indication that having internal 
candidates competing for the CEO position may cause a delay in firms’ on-going project. 
However, when taking into consideration of the interaction terms, when the CEO 
departure is unexpected, having a horse race succession increases capital expenditure. 
This indicates the horse race may be more beneficial when CEO suddenly departs, rather 
than in planned departures. If a firm allows its internal talent to compete for the CEO 
position rather than appointing a default person as the new CEO after an unexpected 
departure,  the winner may be able to better continue with corporate expansion.  
 
 
5.4. The costs of not planning for succession 
 
--INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE-- 
CEO succession is not free. So far my findings indicate that  a lack of CEO 
succession may be detrimental to shareholder value and to long term firm performance. 
However, it may be beneficial for certain firms to not plan for succession, if the benefit 
outweights the costs of planning. In this section, I intend to calculate the costs of firms 
not having a plan for succession and show the impact of CEO succession planning on 
change in firm value. Table 10 shows the results.  Based on the CARs calculated in the 
earlier sections, firms with planned departure have an average CAR of 0.11% across the 
three event windows around the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement. Given that 
their market capitalization is on avergae $10,273 million, the dollar change of their 
market value is $11.30 million. In comparison, firms with unexpected CEO departures 
have an avergae CAR of -2.18% across the three event windows around the departure 
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announcement. Given that their average market capitalization is $5,717 million, the dollar 
change of their market capitalization is -$124.63 million. The change in firm value 
potentially due to  succession planning is therefore $135.93 million.  
The 2014 report on senior executive succession planning and talent development by 
IED and Stanford University shows that a CEO succession plan is reviewed by the board 
of directors from once a year to once a quarter. When boards do meet to discuss 
succession plans, they typically allott an hour for succession planning. Therefore, given 
that a typical board in a public traded company in the US has 10 members (Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen 2008) and that board members are compensated $100 per hour for their time, 
the total costs to have directors discuss CEO succession planning will range from 
$10,000 to $40,000. For the sake of the argument in this section, I treat this cost as 
negligible.  Therefore, the costs of not planning for succession is about $136 million. 
Given the large magnitute of the change in firm value associated with a lack of 
succession planning, I argue that it is doubtful that the costs of not planning for 
succession will outweigh the benefits. Although it is not the intention of this paper to 
investigate whether all firms should have a succession plan, it will certainly be interesting 
for future research to examine why firms will choose to not plan for succession, and what 
types of firms benefit the most from having a succcession plan. 
6. Conclusion 
 
While CEO succession planning has received a lot of attention recently—
particularly in social media, there has been a dearth of studies evaluating its necessity. 
Moreover, the succession planning process itself has not been clearly described, possibly 
because this process is difficult to observe and evaluate. In this paper, I determine 
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whether CEO succession planning matters and I examine which actions board of directors 
take to prepare for a succession in the company’s top executive leadership. To do so, I 
use lead time—a proxy measure for CEO succession planning representing the number of 
days between the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement and their actual departure 
date. I also use this measure to compare firms with planned departure (i.e. retirement) to 
firms with unexpected CEO departures and find that firms with planned departure have 
significantly longer lead time and lower disruption costs. Specifically, when the CEO 
departure is expected, firms tend to experience less negative excess stock returns, more 
favorable change in firm performance, as well as continued capital expenditures. This 
paper contributes to the CEO succession planning literature by showing that longer lead 
time in CEO succession planning is critical to lower disruption costs and ensure a 
smoother transition. Thus, the new SEC requirement that CEO succession planning be 
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Blockholder is a binary variable that equals to 1 if there is at least one blockholder in the 
sample firm, and 0 otherwise. Blockholder and institutional ownership information are 
obtained from Thomson Financial database.  
Change in Indperf_adj ROA is the change in industry-and-performance-adjusted ROAs 
from one year up to three years after the incumbent CEO departure.  
Lead time is the number of days between the incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement 
date and their actual departure date.  
Days before announcing the new CEO is the number of days between the incumbent 
CEOs’ departure announcement date and the appointment date of a new permanent CEO. 
Days before new CEO takeover is the number of days between the incumbent CEOs’ 
departure announcement date and actual date the new CEO takes over.  
Days since new CEO appt COO/President is the executive tenure as COO and/or 
President. 
Departing CEO founder is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the departing CEO was 
the founder, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age is the maximum number of years between CRSP listing age and Compustat 
listing age.  
Firm riskt-1 is the standard deviation of daily stock price during the prior calendar year. 
Industry-adjusted ROAt-1 is measured as a sample firm’s ROA minus the median 
industry ROA, using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  
Industry-and-performance-adjusted ROAt-1 is defined as each sample firm’s ROA less 
the ROA of a non sample firm, matched on primary two-digit SIC industry and with the 
ROA within 10% in the previous year. If no firm in the same two-digit industry has a 
year-1 ROA within 10%, I first select the firm in the same one- digit industry, and then 
disregard industry and only match on year-1 ROA within 10%. 
Market value of equity (mkcap) is calculated using end of the year closing price of 
equity to multiply common stock shares outstanding.  
New CEO is current employee is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the replacement 
CEO has been with the hiring company for at least 2 years prior to the departure, and 0 if 
the they are hired from outside (this is a result not summary stats).  
New CEO is Current director is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the replacement 
CEO has been a director in the firm for at least 6 months, and 0 otherwise.  
New CEO Age is obtained from Execucomp as of the year of CEO departure. 
New CEO # of external board seats is the total number of other public board connections 
the new CEO possesses.   
Outside director connections is calculated as the sum of other public board seats held by 
outside directors in the sample firm. 
Post year 2001 is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the year of departure is after 2001, 0 
otherwise.  
Percentage of insider directors and Number of inside directors are the percentage and 
number of inside directors on board.  
Relay succession is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the new CEO has been the 
COO and/or President before they were promoted.  
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R&D intensity is defined as research and development expenditure to sales. I calculate 
R&D intensity by taking the maximum value of 0, or R&D expense from Compustat, 
whichever is larger, and then divide it by sales.  
ROA is the operating earnings before interest and taxes (OIBDP) over total book assets 
(AT).  
Total # of inside directors is the total number of inside directors on board.  
% of existing director departurest+n
 
is the percentage of existing director turnover rate up 
to three years after the CEO departure. 
% of senior management turnover within 18mons is the percentage of senior 





Table 1 Planned retirement and unexpected CEO departure by time  
This table shows the distribution of planned and unexpected CEO departures during the period of 1999 to 2008. Departing 
CEO age information is from Execucomp and may not be available for all observations. Lead time is the number of days 
between the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement date and their actual departure date. 
 
 Reasons for CEO departure 
 Planned (N=843) Unexpected (N=76) 
Year 
Frequency Lead time 
(days) 
Departing 
CEO age  




1999 77 (9.13%) 80.44 63.56 5 (6.58%) 0.00 60.00 
2000 99 (11.74%) 81.87 61.01 8 (10.53%) 9.37 72.00 






 0.00 54.00 





 2.57 56.25 






 0.00 51.50 





























Table 2 Firm, corporate governance, and departing CEO characteristics  
This table shows the univariate comparison of firm, corporate governance and departing 
CEO characteristics. The mean values of each variable are followed by mean differences 
between subsamples of firms with planned and unexpected CEO departures. Previous 1yr 
adj. stock return is the cumulative abnormal return in the prior year, and Previous 1yr 
raw stock return is the raw cumulative stock return the prior year. The median 
differences are tabulated for two variables: market capitalization and prior 1-year 
cumulative stock returns. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean is significantly different 
from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bolded letters and c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-
test for mean differences between subsamples of Planned retirement and unexpected 
CEO departures are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. The definition of all other 
variables is in the Appendix. Note: information on some variables may not be available 
for the whole sample period.   
 








between (1) and 
(2) 
Firm characteristics    
  Firm age 24.24 22.41 1.83 
  Tobin’s Q 2.79 2.48 0.31 
  Market Cap (000,000) 10,273  5,717 4,556  
  R&D intensity 2.37% 2.97% -0.60% 
  Leverage 22.68% 22.20% 0.40% 
  Free cash flow 4.12% 2.42% 1.70%
a
 
  Firm riskt-1 2.51% 2.67% -0.16% 
  Institutional ownership 64.68% 64.04% 0.64% 
  Blockholder 74.38% 66.67% 6.71% 
  Industry adjusted ROAt-1 4.87% 4.47% 0.40% 
  Market to book ratio 1.42 1.38 0.04 
  Previous 1yr adj. stock return 7.35%*** -0.46% 7.52% 
  Previous 1yr raw stock return 2.23%*** 2.10%* 0.12% 
 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
  %. of inside directors 20.32% 23.03% -2.71%
a
 
  Num. of inside directors 1.97 2.17 -0.10 
  Board size 10.01 9.67 0.34 
  Board independence 67.45% 68.67% -1.22% 




Table 3 Comparison of transitional characteristics and disruption costs between 
planned and unexpected CEO departures  
This table shows the univariate comparison of CEO transitional characteristics and 
disruption costs between firms with Planned retirement and unexpected CEO departures. 
Panel A shows the comparison of CEO transitional characteristics. Lead time is the 
number of days between the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement date and their 
actual departure date. Days before announcing the new CEO is the number of days 
between the incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement date and the appointment date of 
a new permanent CEO. Days before new CEO takeover is the number of days between 
the incumbent CEOs’ departure announcement date and actual date the new CEO takes 
over. Relay succession is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the new CEO has been 
the COO and/or President before they were promoted. Days since new CEO appt     
COO/President is the executive tenure as COO and/or President. Panel B shows the 
comparison of market reaction (cumulative abnormal returns) at the announcement of the 
incumbent CEO departure, as well as excess stock returns within 30, 60, and 90 days 
after the incumbent CEOs’ actual departure date. The announcement CARs are computed 
in Eventus using both market adjusted (untabulated) and market model, and the excess 
returns are the market-adjusted cumulative stock returns within 30, 60, and 90 days of 
actual departure date. Stock return data is from CRSP. Panel C shows the comparison of 
changes in firm performance. I calculate both industry-adjusted ROAs (not tabulated, but 
available by request), as well as industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs. Definitions of 
all other variables are in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean is 
significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bolded letters c, b, and a 
indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between Planned retirement and 
unexpected CEO departure subsamples are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Changes 

















Lead time 75.01 3.53 71.48
c
 
Days before new CEO takeover 75.54 68.92
 
6.61 
Days without leadership 0.53 61.33 -60.80
c
 





New CEO is current employee 75.03% 73.07% 1.95% 
New CEO is on board 50.29% 47.43% 2.86% 
New CEO board tenure (years) 2.80 7.06 -4.26
c
 
Relay succession 40.45% 28.20% 12.24%
c
 
# of firms with relay succ. 341 22 -- 
--Years since new CEO appt     






Panel B: Cumulative abnormal stock returns 













































Salest-1 (000,000) 6,169.05 3,624.25
 
2,544.80 
Chg in salest-1 to t+1 (%) 18.09% 27.19%
 
-1.41 











ROAt-1  13.56% 12.87%
 
0.68% 













CapExt-1 (000,000) 347.53 246.48
 
101.00 
Chg in CapExt-1 to t+1 (%) 7.69% 8.38%
 
-0.51 













Table 4 Firm and board adjustment comparison  
This table shows the board and director characteristics three years prior to the CEO departure. Bolded 
letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between firms with planned and 
unexpected CEO departures are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Definitions of all variables are in the 
Appendix. 
 
 Planned retirement (N=843) Unexpected departures (N=76) 
 t-3 Δt-2 Δt-1 t-3 Δt-2 Δt-1 
Board size 9.94 0.03  0.01 10.02 -0.13 0.06 
Board independence 65.71% 0.98%  1.17% 63.33% 3.52%
a 
1.89% 
Existing director turnover 9.25% -0.58% 2.01% 12.04%
a -0.20% 2.49% 
Free cash flow 4.28% -0.25%  0.07% 3.97% -0.25% -1.45%
a 
Capital expenditure (000,000) 331.67 18.91%  17.39% 216.27 31.41% 24.09% 
       
 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 





















Table 5 Differences in transitional costs between with above versus below median 
lead time when Planned retirement 
This table shows the univariate comparison of CEO transitional characteristics and 
disruption costs between firms with above and below-median lead time when the CEO 
departures are Planned retirement. Panel A shows the comparison of CEO transitional 
characteristics. Panel B shows the comparison of market reaction (cumulative abnormal 
returns) at the announcement of the incumbent CEO departure, as well as excess stock 
returns within 30, 60, and 90 days after the incumbent CEOs’ actual departure date. Panel 
C shows the comparison of firm performance and the change in capital expenditures 
(CAPEX). CAPEX data is from Compustat, and the change in CAPEX is calculated as 
the difference between CAPEX one-, two-, and three-years after the departure and 
CAPEX one year prior to the departure. I calculate both industry-adjusted ROAs (not 
tabulated, but available by request), as well as industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs. 
Definitions of all other variables are in the earlier tables and in the Appendix. ***, **, 
and * indicate that the mean is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Bolded letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between 
Planned retirement and unexpected CEO departure subsamples are significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. Changes in performance are winsorized at 1%.  










and (2) (t-stat) 
Firm characteristics    
  Firm age 25.88 22.63 3.25
c
 
  Tobin’s Q 2.82 2.74 0.08 
  Market Cap (000,000) 12,463.45 7,728.96 4,734.50 
  Market to book ratio 1.41 1.44 -0.03 
  R&D intensity 2.23% 2.54% -0.31% 
  Leverage 22.97% 22.34% 0.64% 
  Free cash flow 4.39% 3.80% 0.59% 
  Firm riskt-1 2.35% 2.68% -0.33%
c
 
  Institutional ownership 64.16% 60.99% 3.17%
a 
  Blockholder 73.72% 72.82% 2.90% 
  Industry adjusted ROAt-1 5.24% 4.43% 0.81% 
  Previous 1yr adj.stock return 4.13%** 10.43%*** -6.31%
a 
    
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
  Board size 10.36 9.60 0.76
c
 
  Board independence 69.52% 65.00% 4.52%
c
 







Table 5 Continued 








between (1) and 
(2) 
Lead time (median=34) 142.24 9.46 132.78
c
 





Days without leadership 0.21 1.63
 
-1.42 
Senior management turnover 19.05% 17.73%
 
1.32% 
New CEO is current employee 82.14% 67.93% 14.21%
c
 
New CEO is on board 54.52% 46.08% 8.44%
c
 
New CEO board tenure 2.82 2.78 0.04 
Relay succession 47.85% 33.09% 14.76%
a
 
# of firms using relay succ 201 140 71 
--Days since new CEO appt 
COO/President (years) 1.88  
 
1.92  -0.04 
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal stock returns 













Excess return (0,30) -0.04% 0.52%
 
-0.54% 





Panel D. Change in sales and capital expenditure  
Sales t-1 (000,000) 7,722.42 4,626.63 3,095.80
b 
Chg in salest-1 to t+1 (%) 20.08% 16.09%
 
1.08 


















Chg CAPEXt-1 to t+1 (%) 8.02% 7.36%
 
0.84 














Table 6 Firm and board adjustments by firms with above versus below lead time when Planned retirement 
This table shows the board and director characteristics three years prior to the CEO departure. Bolded 
letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between Planned retirement firms with 
above and below-median lead time are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Definitions of all variables 
are in the Appendix. 
 Above median (N=420) Below median (N=423) 
 t-3 Δt-2 Δt-1 t-3 Δt-2 Δt-1 
Board size 10.19 0.00  0.08 9.68 0.51 -0.07 
Board independence 67.15% 1.04%  1.43% 64.25% 0.93%
 
0.92% 





Free cash flow 4.27% 0.15%  0.01% 4.28% -0.67% 0.13%
 
Capital expenditure (000,000) 410.18 15.95%  14.21% 257.95 21.90% 13.38% 
       
 t-3 t-2 t-1 t-3 t-2 t-1 










Table 7 Multivariate Analysis on Excess Stock Returns after Incumbent CEO 
Departure 
This table shows the estimate of OLS regressions of excess stock returns within 30, 60, 90 
and 360 days after the incumbent CEOs’ actual departure date. The dependent variables are 
value-weighted-market-adjusted excess stock returns. All dependent variables are in the 
percentage format. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. p-values are reported in the parentheses.   
 





(-3,3)  (%) 
(3) Excess return 
(0,30) (%) 
Log (Market cap) 0.078 0.062 0.006 0.330 
 (0.38) (0.65) (0.98) (0.34) 
Founder CEO  -0.262 -0.381 1.140 0.052 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.23) (0.96) 
Firm risk (%) 0.105 0.300 0.273 0.183 
 (0.87) (0.46) (0.99) (0.20) 
R&D intensity (%) -0.029 0.068 -0.092 0.083 
 (0.43) (0.35) (0.33) (0.57) 
Institutional ownership (%) -0.011*** -0.014** -0.013 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.18) (0.87) 
Prior 1yr stock return (%) -0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.017* 
 (0.96) (0.53) (0.37) (0.09) 
Leverage (%) 0.336 0.494 0.680 -0.581 
 (0.66) (0.68) (0.64) (0.82) 
Free cash flow (%) -0.519 -2.240 1.090 5.880 
 (0.79) (0.64) (0.84) (0.46) 
Unexpected departure -1.770*** -2.970*** -3.340*** -5.990*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant, year and industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of observations 901 901 901 892 
R-sq 0.052 0.049 0.039 0.046 
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Table 8 Multivariate analysis: Change in Sales around Incumbent CEOs’ Actual Departure 
This table shows the estimate of OLS regressions of percentage changes in sales over the transition period from one year 
before departure to three years after the actual departure. The dependent variables are changes in sales scaled by sales the year 
prior to the CEO departure. Definitions of all variables are in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in the parentheses.   


















Log (Market cap) 0.590 0.350 0.785 0.568 1.200 1.070 
 (0.50) (0.69) (0.48) (0.61) (0.40) (0.45) 
Founder CEO  4.010 3.970 6.050 5.950 7.470 8.470 
 (0.38) (0.39) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33) (0.27) 
Firm risk 0.154 0.784 -1.339 -0.604 -2.164 -0.630 
 (0.88) (0.79) (0.65) (0.58) (0.93) (0.85) 
Prior 1yr stock return  0.147** 0.149** 0.166** 0.167* 0.172*** 0.171*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional ownership 0.095* 0.086* 0.110* 0.101 0.134* 0.129 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
Leverage -0.127* -0.119* -0.144 -0.133 -0.211* -0.191 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (0.11) 
Unexpected departure 0.073 -0.050 0.104 -0.682 0.033 -2.146*** 
 (0.20) (0.28) (0.18) (0.25) (0.68) (0.00) 
Horse race succession -0.045 -0.032 -0.058 -0.034 -0.077 -0.059 
 (0.16) (0.33) (0.16) (0.43) (0.16) (0.27) 
Above median lead time  0.067***  0.060**  0.084** 
  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Unexpected departure*  -0.097  -0.212  -0.031 































Constant, year, and industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations 883 883 849 849 814 814 
R-sq 0.185 0.190 0.371 0.379 0.097 0.098 
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Table 9 Multivariate analysis: Change in capital expenditures around incumbent 
CEOs’ actual departure in firms  
This table shows the estimate of OLS regressions of changes in CAPEX over the period 
from one year before to three years after the actual departure. The dependent variables 
are change in CapEx scaled by sales the year before CEO departure. Definitions of all 
variables are in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in the parentheses.   
Independent variables (1) Change in 
CAPEXt+1 (%) 
(1) Change in 
CAPEXt+2 (%) 
(2) Change in 
CAPEXt+3 (%) 
Log (Market cap) -0.010 0.114 0.057 
 (0.98) (0.57) (0.81) 
Founder CEO -1.390 -0.301 0.273 
 (0.18) (0.78) (0.83) 
Firm risk 0.348 0.356 0.037 
 (0.45) (0.42) (0.93) 
R&D intensity -6.470 0.995 -1.890 
 (0.43) (0.91) (0.84) 
Institutional ownership 2.500* 3.090** 3.170** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior 1yr stock return 3.680*** 3.332*** 3.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Leverage 4.460* 6.280** 7.520*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) 
Free cash flow -3.590 2.860 3.570 
 (0.60) (0.63) (0.63) 
Unexpected departures -3.420*** -1.970* -3.920** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Horse Race -3.34** -3.05 -4.49** 
 (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) 
Unexpected departures 4.330* 2.890* 0.895 
  *Horse race (0.01) (0.08) (0.66) 
    
Constant, year, and industry 
dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
    
Number of observations 762 736 707 











Table 10 The Cost of CEO Succession Planning 
This table shows that calculation of the costs of CEO succession planning, based on the CARs 














Planned 0.06% (0,0) 
0.11% 10,273 11.30 
$10,000-
$40,000 
 0.24% (-1,1) 
 0.04% (-3,3) 
 
Unexpected -1.31% 
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BOARD COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE: EVIDENCE 














































A firm’s ability to quickly recover from setbacks is of great importance to its 
stakeholders and investors. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the 
monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm 
specific experience and knowledge which could improve organizational resiliency. The 
main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether inside directors improve 
organizational resiliency using the context of sudden CEO departures when CEO 
succession is not possible. The sudden departure of a CEO creates uncertainty for a 
company’s managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and investors. Lengthy delays 
before making a replacement, or lack of resiliency, are commonly accompanied by an 
erosion in operating performance. Using a unique data set of 351 sudden CEO departures 
from 1991 to 2009, I find evidence that firms with inside directors other than the CEO are 
more resilient. The likelihood of identifying an inside replacement after a sudden 
departure and the average change in abnormal operating performance around a sudden 
departure are both greater when firms have at least one insider other than the CEO on the 
board. In addition, firms with greater inside director presence are less likely to engage in 
big bath accounting, i.e., taking advantage of the departure to largely write off assets.  In 
further tests, I find that a firm’s resiliency after a sudden CEO departure appears to also 


















Firms can face several shocks during their life cycle.  A firm’s ability to quickly 
recover from setbacks is of great importance to its stakeholders and investors. One 
particularly critical shock to a firm is the sudden departure of its CEO (Worrell, Davidson 
III, Chandy and Garrison, 1986; Behn, Dawley, Riley and Yang, 2006; Salas, 2010). The 
sudden loss of a CEO has the potential to throw a company into a tailspin. Consider, for 
example, the unanticipated resignation of Hewlett-Packard’s (HP) former CEO Mark 
Hurd on August 6, 2010.
8
 Its press release reported that Hurd’s decision was made 
following an investigation surrounding a claim of sexual harassment against Hurd and HP 
by a former contractor to the company. HP’s market value fell by $10 billion, close to a 
10 percent decline following Hurd’s resignation. The perceived importance of being 
resilient when faced with a sudden CEO departure is underscored by the new requirement 
that firms must include a CEO succession planning proposal in their proxy statements 
(SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14E).  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether certain board characteristics are 
related to a firm’s resilience by examining sudden CEO departures, when CEO 
succession is not possible. Understanding the relation between board composition and a 
firm’s ability to quickly recover from shocks such as a sudden CEO departure is 
important in understanding a firm’s ability to manage risk. Specifically, I examine 
whether non-CEO inside directors improve a firm’s ability to quickly recover from a 
sudden loss in executive leadership. Inside directors may possess superior firm specific 
knowledge and experience which may allow firms to recover from shocks more quickly. 
                                                 
8 “HP CEO Mark Hurd resigns; CFO Cathie Lesjak Appointed Interim CEO; HP Announces Preliminary 
Results and Raises Full-year Outlook”, HP press release, August 2010. 
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For instance, inside directors may be better able to assume the role of CEO in either a 
permanent role for a quick recovery or in a temporary role to provide stability during the 
search for a new CEO. Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) indicate that it is less 
costly for firms to replace a CEO with an internal candidate, and thus, firms only choose 
external candidates when they are superior. Moreover, Masulis and Mobbs (2009) 
suggest that inside directors can provide higher quality internal candidates. In contrast, 
too many inside directors on a firm’s board is often associated with ineffective boards 
and entrenchment.  
A CEO departure is categorized as sudden if it is unanticipated by the board of 
directors, hence no adjustments to the board have been made to prepare for the departure. 
Sudden CEO departures may consist of the unexpected CEO departures due to death and 
illness, as well as sudden forced CEO departures due to lawsuits and criminal 
investigations. In the first half of the paper, I use the whole sample of 351 sudden CEO 
departures
9
 between 1991 and 2009, and find that firms with more non-CEO inside 
directors are associated with lower disruption and transitional costs, or greater resilience. 
Specifically, the likelihood of identifying an internal replacement is significantly greater 
when firms have at least one non-CEO insider on the board. Additionally, the average 
change in industry-and-performance adjusted operating performance from one year 
before to three years after the sudden CEO departure is economically greater in firms 
with non-CEO inside directors. In addition, firms with greater inside director presence are 
less likely to engage in large write-offs of assets, i.e., taking a big bath after the CEO 
departure. In the second part of the paper, I use the stricter sample of 119 unexpected 
                                                 
9 Financial and utility firms are excluded in my sample. 
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departures due to death, illness, and sudden resignation over the same period, to make 
sure that the results are not subjected to sample construction. The results are consistent 
with those in the broader sample of sudden CEO departures. 
I further examine whether outside directors with numerous connections enhance a 
firm’s resilience, or mitigate the costs associated with sudden CEO departures. Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, and Omer, Shelley, and Tice (2012) indicate that outside directors 
may add value through their networks. Thus, well-connected outside directors may be 
better able to quickly identify through their networks highly qualified replacements to 
lead the recovery. In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that outside directors 
sitting on numerous boards are too busy to effectively fulfill their responsibilities as 
directors. In this case, outside directors may quickly choose replacements through their 
connections, but the replacements may not be well qualified to lead a recovery. I find that 
well-connected outside directors are associated with greater resilience after sudden CEO 
departures, and that they play both the identification and certification roles in the 
replacement CEO selection process through their network. In fact, firms with both non-
CEO inside directors and well-connected outside directors appear to be more resilient to 
sudden CEO departures; whereas firms with no non-CEO inside directors and not 
connected outside directors are least resilient. Specifically, well-connected outside 
directors are associated with more experienced replacement CEOs. Moreover, 
replacement CEOs tend to be appointed within a shorter time period, are more likely to 
be part of an outside director’s network, and are better connected themselves. The results 
are robust to controlling for other factors that may influence the CEO selection process 
and to using different criteria when identifying a CEO departure as sudden. 
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To my knowledge this is the first study to examine the relation between certain 
board characteristics and a firm’s ability to recover after a potentially disruptive shock, 
i.e., a sudden CEO departure. Prior literature (Worrell, Davidson III, Chandy and 
Garrison, 1986; Behn, Dawley, Riley and Yang, 2006; Salas, 2010, Rivolta 2014) 
suggests that CEO succession planning is important. This paper sheds light on the 
important roles inside directors play in crisis management and organizational resilience 
when succession planning is not possible. In addition, consistent with the argument in 
Coles et al. (2012), the results provide another avenue through which well-connected 
outside directors can add value identifying and certifying the new CEO through their 
connections/networks. Given the importance of both non-CEO inside directors and well-
connected outside directors, the findings in this paper help inform the debate on uniform 
mandates for boards. Numerous studies examine the monitoring role of boards, but the 
advisory role is not as well-explored. Consistent with Linck et al., Coles et al., and Boone 
et al., the results in this paper provide another avenue through which inside directors and 
well-connected outside directors may add value advising firms in the new CEO selection 
process after sudden CEO departures. Last but not least, this paper contributes to the 
literature of earning management in the form of large write-offs of assets, i.e., big bath. 
Moehrle (2002) and Christensen et al. (2008) argue that large negative special charges 
can be an extreme form of earnings management. The results in this paper show that 
firms with inside directors are less likely to engage in big bath accounting. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior 
literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics. Section 4 presents univariate and multivariate results using sudden 
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CEO departures. Section 5 provides additional analysis using the stricter sample of 
unexpected CEO departures. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion. 
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1. Inside/outside Successions 
The existing literature on the succession type reflects a common theme: inside 
successions are associated with maintenance strategies, and outside successions are 
associated with changes in corporate culture and resource allocation.  Agrawal, et al. 
(2006) find that firms prefer inside succession to outside succession, unless the outside 
replacements are significantly better than the insiders. Naveen (2006) argues that the 
likelihood of inside succession is dependent upon firm complexity and industry 
homogeneity. Specifically, inside successions are more common in larger, more 
diversified firms, and firms in more heterogeneous industries, in which the costs of 
information transfer is higher. Behn et al. (2006) report that firms who choose inside 
successors outperform those who choose outside successors. I predict that boards with a 
greater number of non-CEO inside directors prior to the departure may be more prone to 
appoint an insider after a sudden CEO departure given that firms have a larger pool of 
internal candidate and that it may take boards less time to appoint a candidate from inside 
than outside the company. 
 
 
2.2. Firm specific information, R&D intensity and board structure 
Current corporate governance studies on inside directors have found that they 
possess superior firm specific information than outside directors. Studies as early as 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that though independent of the CEO, outsider directors 
lack information on firm projects. Along the same line, Raheja, C. (2005) suggests that 
high R&D intensive firms benefit from having more insiders on board, and that board 
size and composition is a function of the “trade-off between maximizing the incentive for 
insiders to reveal their private information, minimizing coordination costs among 
outsiders and maximizing the ability of outsiders to reject inferior projects” (p.283). 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) advocate “friendly” board structures with insiders, as they 
argue that insiders possess more firm specific information than outsiders, and that a 
friendly board facilitates the transfer of information from insiders to outside board 
members. Masulis and Mobbs (2009) conclude that insiders possess more firm specific 
information. They find that outside directorships provide incentives for inside directors to 
facilitate the transfer of information to other directors, hence improving board 
performance and firm performance. Following Raheja, C. (2005) and Coles et al. (2008), 
I use R&D intensity to proxy for the importance of firm specific knowledge. I predict that 
high R&D intensity firms are more likely to choose a new permanent CEO from inside 
the company. 
2.3. Inside director as the new CEO 
Musulis and Mobbs (2009) define inside directors holding outside board seats as 
certified inside directors (CIDs), and argue that the knowledge and skills possessed by 
these CIDs provide incentives for the current CEO to improve performance, or they may 
be replaced by the CIDs. Current literature has not provided much information regarding 
inside directors’ potential as the new CEO. Given the earlier discussion that inside 
directors possess firm specific knowledge, and that they are already familiar with other 
59 
 
board members and senior managers, the transition should be smoother. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the appointment of an inside director as the new CEO is associated with 
lower costs in the transition, and better change in firm performance.  
2.4. Board structure and change in firm performance after the departure 
Sudden CEO departures generate disruption costs during the transitional period. I 
proxy these costs using the new CEO’s tenure, as well as the delay between incumbent 
CEO departure and the successor appointment. Existing literature has found that the new 
CEO, especially those hired from the outside, typically have about 18 months to prove 
their competency to shareholders (Zhang 2008, Conlin 2009, and Zhang and Rajagopalan 
2010). This argument is grounded in the information asymmetry theory that board of 
directors may have incomplete information about the CEO candidate. Hence, it is 
possible that the board may have hired the wrong executive and subsequently fires the 
new CEO to correct the mistake, which leads to greater new CEO turnover. The new 
CEO turnover could be a huge cost to the company given the average severance pay the 
companies are offering to their executives (Huang 2011). I test whether the new CEO 
turnover could be lower (longer tenure) if they were appointed by with strong insider  
presences.  
Behn et al. 2006 find that delay in appointing a successor after unexpected senior 
executive death is associated with decreasing operating performance, measured by 
change in sales, change in income before extraordinary items scaled by sales, calculated 
over one-year and two-year period, and lower cumulative returns around the death of the 
CEO. Following their study, I hypothesize that firms with strong insider presence boards, 
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as well as better-connected boards, experience shorter delays, hence shorter periods of 
uncertainty. 
The arguments above also suggest that if certain boards are effective at managing 
the information they possess, and lowering transitional cost after a sudden event, then 
they should be associated with better change in firm performance, or at least maintain 
continuity. In more R&D intensive firms, having more insiders on board may be 
associated with greater change in performance. 
2.5. Can well-connected outside director enhance firm resilience? 
Outside directors may also play a role in choosing the new CEO, via their 
connections to other public boards. Omer et al. (2012) argues that well-connected 
directors may not be associated with lower firm performance, as busy director hypothesis 
predicted. These directors may be beneficial to firms with greater investment 
opportunities, because they facilitate the transfer of useful information. In addition, Coles 
et al. (2012) argue that outside director connections proxy for derived demand for their 
experience, expertise, and service. Firms that have greater advising needs benefit from 
having well connected outside directors. I predict that well connected outside directors 
may also be exposed to a larger pool of qualified outside CEO candidates. Therefore, 
they may enhance firm resilience via their network, after a sudden CEO departure. Their 
roles may be particularly important in firms with no non-CEO inside directors before the 
departure. 
2.6. Big bath hypothesis 
Big bath accounting has been described as firms having large write-offs in their 
profit and loss statement in order to create more favorable returns in the subsequent years 
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(Healy 1985, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Walsh, Craig, and Clarke 1991, Moehrle 
2002). Moehrle (2002) argues that big bath can be seen as an extreme form of earnings 
management. Christensen, Paik, and Stice (2008) relate big bath to a firm’s deferred tax 
allowance. They use large negative special items charges (Compustat Annual Data Item 
17) to proxy big bath, and identify all firms reporting special charges that exceeds 10% of 
their total assets the same fiscal year. The authors hypothesize that big bath firms will 
have lower operating performance the year after. They reason that if managers possess 
private information about a firm’s future perspective, the performance next year should 
reflect this information. I use the same measure to proxy big bath. Big bath is a binary 
variable that equals to 1 if firms report negative special item charges that equals to or 
exceeds 10% of their total asset, and 0 otherwise. Since inside directors may possess 
more firm specific information, I predict that firms with greater insider presence are more 
likely take advantage of the CEO departure and write off bad assets, i.e., taking a big 
bath.  
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 I use data from eight different sources. I first identify the initial sample of CEO 
departures during the period 1991-2009 from Execucomp, which covers S&P 1500 firms.  
CRSP and Compustat provide stock returns and accounting information. CEO successor 
board experience and corporate governance data are identified through the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director Database
10
. For the time period not 
covered by IRRC (1991-995), I use Compact Disclosure data to gather board size and 
                                                 





. Institutional ownership information is obtained through 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Ownership Data. I hand collect data to fill in any 
observations where CEO appointment date or the date he/she joined the company is 
missing in Execucomp, for the purpose of identifying CEO tenure.  
 The initial sample contains 2,522 CEO departures identified from Execucomp 
during the period of 1991-2009.  I use the fiscal year as unit of time and merge the initial 
sample with CRSP and Compustat, then merge with IRRC Director Database by 
matching each annual shareholder meeting date for a firm with the fiscal year in which 
the meeting is held. I exclude dual class firms and any observations where there was no 
actual succession; for instance, the change of CEO captured is due to the change of their 
last name, but the two observations are actually the same person. After the merging 
process, there were around 2,300 CEO departures during the 1991-2009 period.  
For all 2,300 CEO departures, I use Factiva, Lexis Nexis and proxy statements to 
hand collect the following information: (1) CEO successor origin. This information is 
missing for some observations due to the missing data in Execucomp on the date the 
CEO joined the company. I follow Parrino (1997) definition on insider versus outsiders. 
Insiders are successors that have been with the company for at least one year prior to 
becoming CEO; and outsiders are successors that have been with the company for less 
than a year prior to becoming CEO. (2) Interim CEOs. Whether the news release states 
that the successor is an interim or permanent CEO. (3) Cause of departure. I categorize 
the departure of the CEO into natural retirement, forced resignation, unexpected 
                                                 
11 I am grateful for Tina Yang at Villanova University for generously sharing director 
data with me. 
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departures, M&A activity, restructuring, proxy fight, and the separation of CEO/chairman 
duality. (4) The earliest announcement date of incumbent CEO departure and permanent 
replacement CEO appointment. (5) The actual incumbent CEO departure and new CEO 
takeover date. (6) Whether the replacement CEO has been on the appointing company’s 
board of directors at least six months before the appointment announcement. (7) Cause of 
the unexpected departure. Whether the unexpected departure is due to sudden death, 
illness, or is due to incumbent CEO being hired away either by a better company, or 
accepted a government job. (8) Whether the replacement CEO has had CEO experience 
before in other companies. (9) Whether the retiring CEO is the founder of the company, 
and whether the company is a family company. (10) The previous positions held by 
replacement CEOs. 
After collecting data for the whole CEO departure sample, I narrow my focus 
onto sudden CEO departures. In the first half of the paper, I examine my research 
questions by using the whole sample. A CEO departure is categorized as sudden if it is 
unanticipated by the board of directors, hence no adjustments to the board have been 
made to prepare for the departure. Sudden CEO departures may consist of the unexpected 
CEO departures due to death and illness, as well as sudden forced CEO departures due to 
lawsuits and criminal investigations. A CEO departure is categorized as unexpected when 
the CEO departure (or decision to leave) is neither a result of poor performance, nor of 
regulatory and/or criminal investigation. It should be a genuinely unexpected event. 
Although a CEO’s departure may have come to a surprise to the market, it will not be 
included in my sample if the board was aware of the departure (or decision to leave), or if 
it was under the mutual agreement between the CEO and the board. In the second part of 
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the paper, I use a stricter sample of unexpected CEO departures to make sure that my 
results are not subjected to sample construction. The final sample consists of 351 sudden 
CEO departures from 1991 to 2009, out of which 119 are unexpected departures. 
I use two measures of performance. The first is the industry-adjusted ROA, 
measured as a sample firm’s ROA minus the median industry ROA, using the Fama and 
French (1997) 48-industry classification. To control for potential mean reversion in 
accounting returns for poorly performing firms, I follow the methodology of Barber and 
Lyon (1996) to compute changes in industry-and-performance adjusted ROA. Each 
sample firm with a sudden CEO departure is matched to a control firm with no CEO 
departures. Industry-and-performance adjusted ROA is then defined as each sample 
firm’s ROA less the ROA of a control firm, matched on primary two-digit SIC industry 
and with the ROA within 10% in the previous year. If no firm in the same two-digit 
industry has a year-1 ROA within 10%, I first select the firm in the same one- digit 
industry, and then disregard industry and only match on year-1 ROA within 10%. 
In order to demonstrate that firms that experience sudden CEO departures are 
comparable to the universe of firms that experienced general CEO departures, I compare 
summary statistics on firm, corporate governance and departing CEO characteristics to 
Coles et al. 2008 (JFE) (untabulated). Their sample consists of 8,125 CEO turnovers over 
the period of 1992-2001.The definition of all variables is provided in the Appendix. The 
average board size in my sample is nine members, with two insiders and seven outsiders. 
The insider percentage is 20.63%. These numbers are comparable to those in Coles et al. 
Boards on average have two insiders and eight outsiders, with insider percentage 22% for 
firm year observations from Execucomp over the period of 1992-2001. Using data over 
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the period 1989-1994, Huson et al. (2001) find that the median board size is 12, with 
median insider percentage of 21%. The mean firm age in my sample is 20 years, R&D 
intensity is 3.74%, and stock price volatility is 3.29%. These results are a bit different 
from those of Coles et al.. They report an average of 28 years in firm age, R&D intensity 
of 1.9%, and firm risk 2.6%. Compared to their general sample, firms that experience 
sudden CEO departures are younger, more R&D intensive, and experienced greater stock 
volatility during the prior year.  
4. Analysis Using the Sudden CEO Departures 
 
4.1. Comparison of CEO transitional characteristics 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
 To provide an initial assessment of my hypotheses, I compare sudden CEO 
departure replacement decisions for two categories of firms: (1) firms with at least one 
non-CEO inside director and (2) firms with no non-CEO inside director. Table 1 
illustrates the comparison of the firm and corporate governance characteristics based on 
inside director presence. There seems to be no systematic differences in firm 
characteristics in the two subsamples, except for Tobin’ Q. Firms with greater inside 
director presence have higher firm valuation. However, the differences in corporate 
governance characteristics are significant. Specifically, firms with at least one non-CEO 
inside director have greater insider presence by design. They also have larger boards with 
lower board independence, are more likely to be clustered during the time period before 
2001. These results indicate that since there is no significant difference in firm 
characteristics between the two subsamples ex ante, any performance differences ex post 
to the departure may be associated with the difference in board composition. 
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--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 2 shows the CEO transition characteristic based on inside director presence. 
Panel A shows that permanent replacement CEO characteristics. Firms are significantly 
more likely to use inside succession and to appoint and inside director as the new CEO if 
they have at least one non-CEO inside director on board. Specifically, the likelihood of 
inside succession is 64.80% versus 30.85% (p<0.01), and the likelihood of appointing an 
inside directors is 45.81% when there is at least one non-CEO inside director. The new 
CEOs appointed by both boards are similar in age and possess equal external board seats. 
In addition, the proportion of new outside CEOs identified through existing board 
members’ network is similar.  
Panel B demonstrates the replacement transitional characteristics. On average, the 
number of days without permanent or interim CEO leadership is 53.92 days in the 
subsample with at least one non-CEO inside director. Although this period without 
leadership is shorter in this subsample, the difference is not statistically significant. In 
addition, although firms in both subsamples are equally likely to use interim CEOs while 
searching for the permanent replacement, 48.97% of the interims are inside directors in 
firms with at least one non-CEO inside director. And the vast 75% of these inside director 
interims became the permanent replacement later on. In the same subsample, 12.25% of 
the interim CEOs are outside directors, and 42.85% of these outside directors eventually 
became the permanent CEO. In contrast, in the subsample of firm with no non-CEO 
inside directors, 25.00% of the interims are outside directors and 37.50% of them became 
the permanent CEO later on. These results indicate that non-CEO inside directors can 
play two roles in reducing transitional costs: they can either be appointed as the new 
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permanent CEO, or act as interim to provide stability to the firm, while it searches for a 
competent new permanent CEO. This is consistent with the hypotheses in section 2.1 that 
firms are more likely to use inside succession and appoint inside directors as the new 
CEOs when they have a larger inside director presence.  
4.2. Change in stock and firm performance around sudden CEO departures 
--INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-- 
 Table 3 shows the univariate analysis results for change in stock and firm 
performance around the announcement of unexpected CEO departures. I calculate all 
three measures of firm performance: raw ROA, Fama French 48 industry-adjusted ROA, 
as well as industry-and-performance-adjusted ROA to control for mean reversion. I argue 
that change in firm performance one year around the year of sudden CEO departure 
announcement measures the costs associated with the transition, as firms adapt to the 
shock; whereas changes in performance two years and three years after the departure 
announcement may reflect the new CEO quality. Panel A tabulates the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) from 3 days before to 3 days after the announcement of 
incumbent CEO departure. Panel B shows the comparison of prior fiscal year industry-
and-performance adjusted ROA to up to three years after the departure announcement 
based on inside director presence. And Panel C tests the big bath hypothesis and compare 
the percentage of firms reporting a largely negative special item charge that equals to or 
exceeds 10% of total assets in the same fiscal year.  
The results show that investors react negatively at the departure announcements in 
both subsamples, indicating that facing sudden CEO departures, shareholders are 
concerned with the future perspective of the company. The only difference between the 
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subsamples is that there seems to be information leakage in firms with no non-CEO 
inside directors, as the CAR is negative and significant in the event window (-3,3). Firms 
with greater inside director presence have significantly higher ROAs from one year 
before to up to three years after the departure announcement year. The differences in 
ROAs seem to be fairly consistent throughout the three-year period. In addition, there is 
no statistical difference in the change in industry-and-performance-adjusted ROA. These 
results indicate that there is not a unambiguous relation between inside director presence 
and change in firm performance around sudden CEO departure. However, this relation is 
fairly significant in the stricter sample of unexpected CEO departures, which will be 
discussed in detail later. Last but not least, I test whether firms with greater inside 
director presence are more likely to take advantage of the CEO departure and engage in 
big bath accounting. Panel C shows that percentage of firms taking a big bath one year 
before and up to three years after the departure announcement. I find that contrary to my 
prediction, firms with greater inside director presence are significantly less likely to 
engage in big bath accounting, compared to their counterparts. Specially, approximately 
4-5% of the firms with at least one non-CEO inside director are involved in recording 
largely negative (greater than 10% of their total assets) special items. In comparison, 9-
12% of the firms with no non-CEO inside director are involved in taking a big bath after 
the incumbent CEO departure. This result may indicate that inside directors can help 
firms weather the storm so that firms have less need to manipulate the books to smooth 
earnings or to create better returns for the future. Whereas firms without inside directors 
other than the CEO may have to write off bad assets to make returns look acceptable in 
the near future. 
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4.3. The determinants of inside succession and the appointment of inside director 
as the replacement CEO 
--INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-- 
In Table 4, I examine the determinants of an inside succession and the 
appointment of an inside director as the new permanent CEO. I use both linear 
probability model, controlling for industry fixed effects and Probit regressions to estimate 
the determinants. I use two measures to capture inside director presence: whether firms 
have at least one non-CEO inside director, and the total number of inside directors on 
board. Consistent with my prediction, ceteris paribus, firms with more inside directors on 
board are more likely to appoint an inside successor. Each additional non-CEO inside 
directors increases the likelihood of inside succession by 24.2% (p<0.01). Firms are also 
more likely to use inside succession after unexpected CEO departures. A change from 
sudden forced to unexpected CEO departure increases the likelihood of inside succession 
by 37.1% (p<0.01). In addition, I find that firm size is positively related to the likelihood 
of inside succession. This finding indicates that larger firms may have a greater pool of 
qualified inside talents, therefore, are more likely to use inside succession to maintain 
continuity, rather hiring from outside the company. 
The likelihood of boards appointing an inside director as the new CEO 
demonstrates a similar pattern as the likelihood of inside succession. Specifically, each 
additional inside director increases the likelihood of boards appointing an inside director 
as the new permanent CEO by 13.3% (p<0.01). In addition, a change from sudden forced 
to unexpected CEO departure increases the likelihood of an inside director appointed as 
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the new CEO by 60.6% (p<0.01). Lastly, firms size also positively impacts the likelihood 
of boards appointing an inside director as the new CEO.   
4.4. Can outside directors enhance firm resilience? 
In this section, I further examine the roles outside directors can play in enhancing 
firm resilience. Although the focus of this paper is on the role of inside directors, it is 
important to understand whether and how outside directors monitor and advise in the new 
CEO selection process. Coles et al. (2012) argue that the number of outside director 
connections (the sum of connections that the outside directors of a firm has with directors 
at other firms) is a proxy for outside directors’ experience, expertise and services. Similar 
to Coles et al., I measure the connectedness of outside directors by calculating the total 
number of outside director connections for each sample firm. I then sort sample firms 
into terciles based the total number of outside director connections. I created two 
variables to capture the ways outside directors could identify qualified CEO successors 
via their connections. Outside CEO same board is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the 
new CEO is hired from outside, and has been sitting on the same board with at least one 
existing director in the departure firm, and 0 otherwise. New outside CEO’s board is a 
binary variable that equals to 1 if at least one existing director has been sitting on the 
board of the outside replacement CEO’s former company.  
--INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE-- 
It is important to understand when and how well-connected outside directors add 
value. Table 5 shows four combinations of inside director presence and outside directors 
connections, (1) LowInside-LowCnct: combination of no non-CEO inside director on 
board before departure and low outside director connections (bottom tercile connections). 
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(2) LowInside-HighCnct: combination of no non-CEO inside director on board before 
departure and top tercile outside director connections. (3) HighInside-LowCnct: 
combination of at least one non-CEO inside director on board before departure and 
bottom tercile outside director connections. (4) HighInside-HighCnct: combination of at 
least one non-CEO inside director on board before departure and top tercile outside 
director connections. 
Overall, the results indicate that firms with non-CEO inside director and well-
connected outside directors are more resilient, when faced with sudden CEO departures; 
whereas firms with no non-CEO inside directors and poorly connected outside directors 
are least resilient. On average, new CEOs appointed by non-CEO inside director and 
well-connected outside directors have the highest external board seats (1.20). These 
board seats may be a reflection of the new CEO’s quality and reputation. Meanwhile, if 
the new CEO is hired from outside the company, they are most likely to be identified 
through interlocked directorships with existing directors (30.00%). Overall, firms with at 
least one non-CEO inside director seem to be more resilient. On average, they have the 
least negative CARs and were able to maintain the highest firm performance around the 
departure announcement year. 
On the other hand, firms with neither the non-CEO inside director nor well-
connected outside directors suffer the most. Specifically, new permanent CEOs appointed 
by the combination non-CEO inside director=0-LowCnct are poorly connected to other 
public boards. It takes boards the longest time to appoint a new CEO (136 days), and 
these CEOs are the least likely to stay more than 18 months after the replacement 
(16.07% new CEO turnover). From the valuation perspective, this combination has the 
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lowest ROA and change in industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs for up to three 
years after the departure, which indicates that not only these firms may have higher 
transitional costs, the new replacement CEO appointed may also be off worse quality. 
The same comparison using a stricter sample of sudden CEO departures are tabulated in 
Table 11 in the Appendix, and the results are consistent yet much stronger than using the 
broader sample of sudden CEO departures. These results imply that firms may not 
weather the storm well if there the incumbent CEO was the only insider on board and the 
outside directors are not well connected to other boards. In addition, the roles played by 
inside and outside directors in lowering transitional costs are particularly important when 
the departure is caused by truly exogenous shocks such as death and illness.  
4.5. Multivariate analysis on changes in firm performance around sudden 
departures 
--INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE-- 
Univariate analysis does not control for other factors that could impact the change 
in performance. In this section, I extend my analysis to a multivariate setting. I rely on 
related prior studies, for instance, Yermack (1996), Naveen (2006), Coles et al. (2008), 
and Coles et al. (2012), for guidance in selecting control variables. Out of the 351 firms 
in the unexpected CEO departure sample, 69 do not have three consecutive years of 
operation after the incumbent CEO departure. They drop out of sample due to 
bankruptcy, delisting, and mergers and acquisitions. In order to make sure that I am 
comparing the same firms before and after the departure, I only use the 282 firms with at 
least three years of ROA after the incumbent CEO’s departure. 
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Table 6 shows the multivariate analysis results on change in firm performance 
around the fiscal year of the departure announcement. The dependent variable in columns 
(1) to (6) is the change in industry-and-performance-adjusted ROA from one year before 
to three years after the fiscal year of departure announcement. I control for whether firms 
have at least one non-CEO inside directors, as well as outside director connections, in 
addition to other firm and corporate governance variables. The coefficients are estimated 
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with the White robustness error. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) do not include interaction terms, and columns (2), (4), 
and  (6) include interaction terms between inside director presence and R&D intensity, 
between outside director connection and R&D intensity, as well as between inside 
director presence and outside director connections. The main finding of this table is that 
non-CEO inside directors are only associated with greater change in firm performance 
when the departure is unexpected. Their roles after an unexpected CEO departure are 
particularly important in R&D intensive firms, in which firm specific knowledge is 
important.  Specifically, although there is no significant relation between greater inside 
director presence alone and change in operating performance, for each additional 
percentage increase in R&D intensity, having at least one non-CEO inside director 
increases firm performance by 7.50%, and 6.20% two years and three years after the 
departure announcement year. This result is consistent with the hypothesis in section 2.3 
that non-CEO inside directors are associated with better change in operating 
performance, in that the replacement CEOs selected by boards with greater insider 
presence may be better quality. It may also indicate that when the sudden CEO departure 
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is forced, firms may be trying to turn around by hiring from outside the company and rely 
less on inside directors.  
Another interesting result is that outside directors connections are positively 
related to change in industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs, which indicates that well-
connected outside directors enhance firm resilience and they play both the identification 
and certification roles in the new CEO selection process through their network. Each 
additional increase in the connections outside directors possess increases change in 
operating performance by 0.50% and 0.60% (p<0.10) two and three years after the 
departure announcement. This is consistent with the hypothesis in section 2.5 that well-
connected outside directors may be associated with lower transitional cost around the 
sudden CEO departure. Replacement CEOs selected by boards with well-connected 
outside directors may also be of better quality.  
4.6. Multivariate analysis on the percentage of firms taking a big bath 
--INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 7 shows the multivariate analysis on the likelihood of firms taking a big bath 
after the CEO departure. I use the same measure as Christensen et al. (2008). The 
dependent variables in columns (1)-(6) are binary variables that equals to 1 if firms report 
a largely negative special items charge (Compustat annual data item 17) that equals to or 
exceeds their total assets over the next three years after a sudden CEO departure. I use 
Probit regressions controlling firm, corporate governance, and managerial discretion 
characteristics. Columns (1), (3), and (5) are without interaction terms, and (2), (4), and 
(6) control for interactions between the cause of the sudden departure and board 
composition, as well as between Free Cash Flow (FCF) and board composition. 
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The results show that firms with greater stock price volatility are more likely to 
engage in taking a big bath after the sudden CEO departure. Christensen et al. (2008) 
argue that if managers have pessimistic private information about the future perspective 
of a firm, they are more likely to take a big bath and smooth earnings and try to create 
better future returns. Managers in firms with greater risk are already more volatile, and 
when faced with a sudden shock of losing their CEO, they may be more likely to engage 
in taking a big bath. Similarly, firms with high R&D intensity and greater managerial 
discretion over internal capital are more likely to take a big bath after the sudden 
departure. 
However, firms with at least one non-CEO inside director are less likely to take a 
big bath. This is consistent with my earlier findings that inside directors can play 
important roles in helping firms weather the storm. They may be more capable of 
continue with the ongoing positive NPV project the departure CEO initiated. For 
instance, firms with greater inside director presence have economically more positive 
change in Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) (untabulated). Therefore firms may have less 
incentive to engage in big bath accounting. Furthermore, greater inside director presence 
is associated with even lower likelihood of big bath accounting when the CEO departure 
is categorized as unexpected. Insider directors’ roles may be particularly important when 
the CEO departure is caused by death, illness, and sudden resignation. Section 5 provides 
detailed discussion of inside directors’ roles after an unexpected CEO departure. 
Firms with greater free cash flow are associated with higher likelihood of big bath 
accounting. This relation is even stronger the first year after the departure when FCF 
interacts with outside director connection. There are two possible explanations of this 
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stronger relationship. First of all, well connected outside directors may provide access to 
external capital for the firm (Coles et al 2012). Therefore managers with greater 
discretionary freedom may have greater incentive to engage in big bath accounting to 
smooth earnings and create better returns to gain excess to external capital in the near 
future. Alternatively, based on the earlier finding that well-connected outside directors 
identify qualified outside CEO successors. It is possible that when the outsider becomes 
the CEO, he/she demands managers to write off assets. However, it is difficult to 
disentangle the two possibilities in the current version of this paper. 
 In summary, inside directors play important roles in crisis management. They can 
either help firms identify qualified inside replacement, or provide stability either as the 
new permanent CEO, or as an interim while firms carry out a careful search for a 
qualified replacement. They are also associated with lower likelihood of big bath 
accounting. In addition, well connected outside directors can also add value by helping 
firms both identifying and certifying quality replacement CEOs through their 
connections.  
5. Additional analysis using a stricter definition of sudden CEO departures 
 
In the previous section, I examined by research questions by using the broader 
sudden CEO departures. In this section, I repeat the same analysis by using a stricter 
sample of unexpected CEO departure due to death, illness, and sudden resignation. This 
sample consists of 119 CEO departures that are genuinely exogenous shocks. When faced 
with an unexpected CEO departure, the time for succession planning is next to zero if 
firms have no plan in place.  Overall, the results are consistent with and much stronger 
than those using the broader sample of sudden CEO departures. 
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5.1. Changes in stock and firm performance around unexpected CEO departures 
--INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE-- 
 Comparison of firm and corporate governance characteristics are tabulated in 
Table 10 in the Appendix. Firms with greater inside director presence are younger than 
their counterpart. The differences in corporate governance characteristics are similar to 
the comparison using the broader sample. Table 8 shows the univariate analysis results 
for change in stock and firm performance around the announcement of the unexpected 
CEO departures. The results are similar to those in the broader sample but statistically are 
much stronger. Specifically, investors react negatively at the departure announcements in 
both subsamples, indicating that facing unexpected CEO departures, shareholders are 
concerned with the future perspective of the company. The differences in CARs are still 
statistically insignificant. However, firms with at least one non-CEO inside director are 
associated with higher return on assets and change in industry-and-performance-adjusted 
ROA two and three years after the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement. The mean 
differences are 5.08% and 5.97% (p<0.10) in the second and third year, respectively. This 
result indicates that although investors are concerned about the uncertainty created by the 
unexpected CEO departures, having non-CEO inside directors may enhance firm reliance 
and help them weather the storm better. The positive change in firm performance may 
also indicate that firms may have a succession plan in place although the departure 
happened unexpectedly. The new CEOs may be able to continue the positive NPV 




5.2. Multivariate analysis on change in firm performance around unexpected CEO 
departure  
--INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE-- 
Table 9 shows the multivariate analysis results on change in firm performance 
around the fiscal year of the unexpected CEO departure announcement. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) to (6) is the change in industry-and-performance-adjusted ROA 
from one year before to three years after the fiscal year of departure announcement. I use 
the same control variables in Table 5. The coefficients are estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) with the White robustness error. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) do not include interaction terms, and columns (2), (4), 
and  (6) include interaction terms between the cause of departure and inside director 
presence, between the cause of departure and outside director connection, and between 
inside director presence and R&D intensity. The main finding of this table is that non-
CEO inside directors are associated with greater change in firm performance two and 
three years after the departure announcement.  Specifically, each additional non-CEO 
inside director alone increases change in industry-and-parlance adjusted performance by 
7.70% and 9.70% in year 2 and year 3, respectively. This result is consistent with the 
earlier findings in Table 5 that the replacement CEOs selected by boards with greater 
insider presence may be better quality. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between R&D intensity and non-CEO inside director is positive and significant 
throughout the three-year period after the departure announcement. This result indicates 
that inside directors play a particularly important role in R&D intensive firms, where firm 
specific information is important. 
79 
 
Also similar to the results in Table 5, outside directors connections are positively 
related to change in industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs, which indicates that well-
connected outside directors enhance firm resilience and they play both the identification 
and certification roles in the new CEO selection process through their network. However, 
controlling for R&D intensity, each additional increase in the connections outside 
directors possess decreases change in operating performance by 13%-20% (p<0.05). This 
result may indicate that outside director connection may not be beneficial in R&D 




I examine the relationship between board composition and organizational 
resilience. More specifically, I investigate whether a greater proportion of non-CEO 
inside directors and well-connected outside directors improves the firms’ ability to 
weather a sudden shift in executive leadership. I find that firms with more non-CEO 
inside directors are associated with lower transitional and disruption costs. These 
directors possess both superior firm specific information and experience and are thus 
better able to either assume the role of CEO or more efficiently identify the replacement 
CEO than outside directors. Their roles are particularly important after an unexpected 
CEO departure due to death, illness and sudden resignation, as well as in R&D intensive 
firms, in which firm specific information is important. In addition, well connected outside 
directors appear to enhance the resiliency through their network. In fact, firms with both 
non-CEO inside directors and well-connected outside directors appear to be more 
resilient to sudden CEO departures than firms with neither directors. These results shed 
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light on the important monitoring and advising roles directors play in crisis management 
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Blockholder is a binary variable that equals to 1 if there is at least one blockholder in the 
sample firm, and 0 otherwise. Blockholder and institutional ownership information are 
obtained from Thomson Financial database.  
Change in Indperf_adj ROA is the change in industry-and-performance-adjusted ROAs 
from one year up to three years after the incumbent CEO departure.  
Current employee is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the replacement CEO has been 
with the hiring company for at least 2 years prior to the departure, and 0 if the they are 
hired from outside (this is a result not summary stats).  
Current director is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the replacement CEO has been 
a director in the firm for at least 6 months, and 0 otherwise.  
Current employee director is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the replacement 
CEO has been an insider/employee in the firm for at least 2 years and as a director in the 
firm for at least 6 months, and 0 otherwise.  
Departing CEO founder is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the departing CEO was 
the founder, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age is the maximum number of years between CRSP listing age and Compustat 
listing age.  
Firm riskt-1 is the standard deviation of daily stock price during the prior calendar year. 
Industry-adjusted ROAt-1 is measured as a sample firm’s ROA minus the median 
industry ROA, using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  
Industry-and-performance-adjusted ROAt-1 is defined as each sample firm’s ROA less 
the ROA of a non sample firm, matched on primary two-digit SIC industry and with the 
ROA within 10% in the previous year. If no firm in the same two-digit industry has a 
year-1 ROA within 10%, I first select the firm in the same one- digit industry, and then 
disregard industry and only match on year-1 ROA within 10%. 
Market value of equity (mkcap) is calculated using end of the year closing price of 
equity to multiply common stock shares outstanding.  
Market to book is the market to book ratio of equity. 
New CEO Age is obtained from Execucomp as of the year of CEO departure. 
New CEO # of external board seats is the total number of other public board connections 
the new CEO possesses.   
Outside CEO same board is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the new CEO is hired 
from outside, and has been sitting on the same board with at least one existing director in 
the turnover firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Outside director connections is calculated as the sum of other public board seats held by 
outside directors in the sample firm. 
Post year 2001 is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the year of departure is after 2001, 0 
otherwise.  
Percentage of insider directors and Number of inside directors are the percentage and 
number of inside directors on board.  
R&D intensity is defined as research and development expenditure to sales. I calculate 
R&D intensity by taking the maximum value of 0, or R&D expense from Compustat, 
whichever is larger, and then divide it by sales.  
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ROA is the operating earnings before interest and taxes (OIBDP) over total book assets 
(AT).  
Total # of inside directors is the total number of inside directors on board.  
# of days without leadership is the number of days between the departure announcement 
of the incumbent CEO and the appointment of either an interim or permanent 
replacement.  
# Days w/o permanent CEO is the number of days between the departure announcement 
of the incumbent CEO and the appointment of a permanent replacement CEO. 
% of director departurest+n
 
is the percentage of existing director turnover rate up to three 
years after the CEO departure. 
% of firms taking a big bath is the percentage of firms reporting large negative special 
item charges (Compustat annual data item 17) that equals to or exceeds 10% of their otal 
assets. 
% of interim appointment is the percentage of sample firms that appointed an interim 
CEO before appointing a permanent CEO.  
% of permanent replacement CEO turnover within 18mons is percentage of firms for 
which the new CEO left the company within 18 months after being hired.  
% of senior management turnover within 18mons is the percentage of senior 





Table 11 Comparison of firm and corporate governance characteristics based on 
inside director presentation 
This table shows the univariate comparison of firm and corporate governance 
characteristics based on whether boards have at least one or no non-CEO inside directors. 
The mean values of the variables are followed by the mean difference between the two 
subsamples. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level. Bolded letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean 
differences between the two subsamples are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Note: 












between (1) and 
(2) 
Firm characteristics    
  Firm age 19.47 20.73 -1.26 
  Market Cap 5,242.83 6,205.02 -962.20
 
  Tobin’s Q 2.44 1.85 0.59
a 
  Market to book ratio 1.21 1.14 0.06
 
  R&D intensity 3.69% 4.83% -1.14% 
  Leverage 22.67% 22.97% -0.31% 
  Free cash flow 2.21% 2.38% -0.17% 
  Firm riskt-1 3.31% 3.28% 0.03%
 
  Institutional ownership 61.24% 64.99% -3.75% 
  Blockholder 70.22% 75.56% -5.34%
 
  Industry adjusted ROAd-1 2.81%*** 1.03% 1.77% 
    
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
   
  %. of inside directors 29.37% 12.94% 16.80%
c 
  Num. of inside directors 2.73 1.00 1.73
c 
  Board size 9.62 8.58 1.04
c 
  Board independence 59.32% 76.06% -16.70%
c 
  Post year 2001 58.33% 76.70% -18.40%
c 
  Outside director connections 6.93 7.60 -0.67
 






Table 12 Comparison of CEO transition characteristics based on inside director 
presentation 
This table shows the univariate comparison of the CEO transitional characteristics based 
on whether boards have at least one or no non-CEO inside directors. t represents the 
fiscal year of the incumbent CEO departure announcement. Panel A shows permanent 
replacement CEO characteristics. Panel B shows the replacement transitional 
characteristics. The number in the parentheses indicates the percentage of interim CEOs 
eventually became the permanent CEOs. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean difference 
is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Note: information on some 
variables may not be available for the whole sample period. Definitions of all variables 
are in the Appendix. 












between (1) and 
(2) 








Current employee director 45.81% -
 
- 
New CEO Age 52.48 52.28 0.20 
New CEO # of external board seats 0.54 0.51 0.03 
Outside CEO same board 12.76% 11.22% 1.54% 












# of days without leadership 53.92 64.43 -10.51 
% of director departurest+1 24.37% 19.06% 5.31% 
% of director departurest+2 22.91% 25.62% -2.70% 
% of director departurest+3 21.37% 30.90% -9.53%* 
% of interim appointment 27.37% 22.86%
 
4.52% 

















% of senior management turnover 





% of permanent replacement CEO 
turnover within 18mons 6.14% 
 
        7.43% -1.28% 
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Table 13 Comparison of changes in stock and firm performance around sudden 
CEO departures based on inside director presence 
This table shows the univariate results of changes in stock and firm performance after a 
sudden CEO departure. Panel A shows the comparison of market reaction (cumulative 
abnormal returns) at the announcement of the incumbent CEO departure. The CARs are 
computed in Eventus using market model. Panel B shows the comparison of change in 
abnormal operating performance. I calculate raw, industry-adjusted (not tabulated, but 
available by request), and industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs up to three years 
after the departure announcement year. Panel C shows the percentage of firms taking a 
big bath – reporting a largely negative special item charge that exceeds 10% of total 
assets. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. Bolded letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences 
between the two subsamples are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Definitions of all 
variables are in the Appendix. Changes in performance are winsorized at 1%.  










between (1) and 
(2) (t-stat) 
CAR (0,0) -1.23%** -0.40%
 
-0.83%  (-1.15) 
CAR (-1,1) -2.29%*** -0.11%
 
-2.18%  (-1.55) 
CAR (-3,3) -2.55%*** -2.19%*
 
-0.37%  (-0.24) 











between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 
ROAt-1 12.32%*** 9.39%*** 3.44%
a
  (2.47) 














  (1.75) 
Indperf_adj ROAt-1 0.01% 0.07%
 
-0.06% (-0.63) 
Change in indperf_adj ROAt+1 2.73%** 2.31%** 0.42%  (0.16) 










Panel C: Big bath hypothesis 
   









between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 
% Firms Taking Big batht-1 6.14% 10.85% -4.71% (-1.59) 
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Table 13 continued    












between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 
















































Table 14 Multivariate analysis on the determinants of inside succession and the 
appointment of an inside director as the new CEO 
The table shows estimates of the linear probability model and probit regressions of the 
determinants of an inside succession and an inside director as the new permanent CEO. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P-values are in the 
parenthesis.  
 
 Inside Succession 
Inside Director New 
CEO 
 
Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Log (Market Cap) 0.160** 0.045** 0.149* 0.033* 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) 
Log (Firm age) 0.083 0.020 -0.248 -0.059 
 (0.55) (0.68) (0.11) (0.15) 
Log (Board size) 0.197 0.055 -0.285 -0.062 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.60) (0.64) 
R&D intensity -1.508 -0.357 2.507 0.632 
 (0.49) (0.60) (0.26) (0.37) 
Free cash flow 0.631 0.272 -0.760 -0.169 
 (0.52) (0.37) (0.48) (0.53) 
Leverage 0.311 0.117 -0.528 -0.141 
 (0.62) (0.58) (0.44) (0.43) 
Prior year stock return -0.123 -0.414 -0.161 -0.033 
 
(0.42) (0.43) (0.36) (0.48) 
Stock price volatilityt-1 6.453** 1.951* -1.548 -0.736 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.90) (0.71) 
Founder CEO 0.536 0.160 0.205 0.047 
 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.68) (0.77) 
Unexpected departure 1.161*** 0.371*** 0.443** 0.133** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
>=1 non-CEO inside directors 0.731*** 0.242***  . 
 (0.00) (0.00)  . 
Log (Total # of inside directors) . . 2.204*** 0.606*** 
 . . (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 351 351 351 351 
R-sq or Pseudo R-sq  0.229 0.307 0.274 0.293 
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Table 15 Do outside directors with connections influence resilience in firms with sudden CEO departures? 
This table shows the comparison of (1) low number of insiders (# of non-CEO inside directors=0) with low outside director 
connection LowCnct (bottom tercile # of connections), (2) low insider presence (# of non-CEO inside directors=0) with high 
outside director connections HighCnct (top tercile # of connections), (3) high insider presence (# of non-CEO inside 
directors>=1) with low outside director connection (bottom tercile # of connections), and (4) high insider presence (# of inside 
directors>=1) with high outside director connections (top tercile # of connections). Panel A shows the comparison of firm and 
permanent replacement CEO characteristics. Panel B shows CEO transitional characteristics. Panel C and D demonstrate 
change in stock and firm performance as well as the percentage of firms engaging in big bath accounting among the four 
combinations of inside director presence and outside director connections. Note that the middle tercile outside director 
connections are not included in this table. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level. Bolded letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between high and low connection 






















Panel A. Firm and Permanent Replacement CEO Characteristics  





































Market Cap 12,286.67 1,345.72 11,901.02
 
852.07 3.96 4.17 0.19 0.10
 
R&D intensity 2.41% 3.73% 3.86% 5.42% -1.25 -1.32 -1.45 -1.41 
Founder CEO 2.00% 7.81% 1.72% 5.35% -1.38 -1.05 0.11 0.53 
New CEO Age 53.93 51.67 53.86 50.14 1.37 0.12 0.04 0.99 
# of External board seats 1.20 0.23 0.87 0.28 4.74 4.03 1.43 -1.01 
Outside CEO same board 30.00% 5.88% 19.35% 3.22% 1.74 2.04 0.69 0.43 
 
Panel B. CEO Transitional Characteristics 
































(2) and (4) 
% of interim appointment 24.00% 31.25% 18.96% 23.21% -0.85 -0.55 0.63 0.98 
# Days w/o permanent CEO 109.20 123.72 86.60
 
135.71 -0.35 -1.70 0.82 -0.30
 
% of permanent replacement 















Table 15 continued 
Panel C. Change in stock and firm performance around sudden departures 
































(2) and (4) 
CARs around the departure 





  CAR (0,0) 0.40% -2.76%** -0.84% -1.84%* 2.37 0.72 1.17 -0.59
 
  CAR (-1,1) -0.02% -2.23%* -0.56% -1.01% 1.34 0.12  0.34  -0.35
 
  CAR (-3,3) 0.09% -2.21% -2.22% -3.52% 1.14 0.37 1.19  -0.38 
Change in firm performance         
  ROAt-1 16.13% 12.03% 12.29% 7.85% 2.06 2.19 2.32 1.87
 
  ROAt+1 15.17% 11.00% 10.54% 7.82% 2.11 1.13  2.46 1.29 
 
  ROAt+2 15.06% 11.10% 10.06% 7.61% 1.66 1.01 2.54 1.25 
 
  ROAt+3 14.71 11.97% 11.87% 5.83% 1.05 2.41  1.50 1.99  
  Indperf_ROAd-1 -0.04% -0.06% 0.15% -0.04% 0.14 1.17 -0.98 -0.16
 
  Change indperf_ROAt+1 1.35% 1.13% 1.28% 3.23%* 0.08 -0.78  0.03 -0.72
 
  Change indperf_ROAt+2 1.90% 3.84% 2.46% 1.86% -0.60 0.21 -0.23 0.57 
 
  Change indperf_ROAt+3 2.98%* 4.24% 5.69%** -0.85% -0.34 1.69 -0.86 1.14 
 
Panel D Percentage of firms taking a big bath 
  % Firms Taking Big batht+1 0.00% 3.33% 7.14% 12.00% -1.22 -0.85 -1.82 -1.75 
 
  % Firms Taking Big batht+1 0.00% 6.12% 3.92% 19.15% -1.73 -2.43 -1.37 -1.95 
 






Table 16 Multivariate analysis: Change in firm performance around sudden CEO departures 
This table shows the estimate of OLS regressions of changes in firm performance from one year before to three years after the 
sudden CEO departure announcement.  It only contains firms with at least three consecutive years of operation after the 
incumbent CEO departure. The dependent variables are changes in industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in the parentheses.  Changes 
in performance are winsorized at 1%. Definitions of all variables are in the Appendix. 
 






























Log (Market cap) -0.014 -0.017 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.65) (0.77) (0.73) (0.72) 
Log (Firm age) 0.024 0.023 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.002 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.59) (0.57) (0.91) (0.84) 
Log (board size) -0.079 -0.093 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.018 
 (0.28) (0.83) (0.83) (0.90) (0.72) (0.77) 
Founder CEO 0.072 0.067 0.086 0.073 0.052 0.043 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.19) (0.30) (0.28) (0.41) 
Post 2001 period -0.043 -0.044 -0.034 -0.033 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19) 
Firm risk 1.374 1.108 -0.025 0.182 0.138 0.238 
 (0.37) (0.46) (0.97) (0.81) (0.86) (0.77) 




-0.010 0.028 0.017 0.028 
 (0.72) (0.61) (0.65) (0.50) (0.37) (0.56) 
R&D intensity -0.112 -0.309 -0.464 0.405 -0.612* -0.104 
 (0.65) (0.60) (0.30) (0.59) (0.06) (0.86) 
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Unexpected -0.011 0.006 0.009 -0.291 0.007 -0.012 
 (0.77) (0.90) (0.69) (0.47) (0.71) (0.73) 
       
Outside director connections -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.005* 0.001 0.006* 
 (0.96) (0.15) (0.96) (0.08) (0.21) (0.06) 
       
Unexpected*  -0.003  0.075*  0.062* 




 (0.09)  (0.08) 
       
Unexpected*  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  Outside director connection  (0.43)  (0.70)  (0.32) 
       
R&D intensity *  0.287  -0.585  -0.138 




 (0.37)  (0.78) 
       
       
Constant and industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations 282 282 283 283 254 254 




Table 17 Multivariate analysis: firms taking a big bath after sudden CEO departures 
This table shows the estimate of Probit regressions of the big bath hypothesis up to three years after the sudden CEO departure 
announcement.  It only contains firms with at least three consecutive years of operation after the incumbent CEO departure. I 
follow Christensen et al. (2008) definition of the big bath accounting. Firms are taking a big bath if they have largely negative 
Special Item expenses (Compustat Data Item 17), and this expense is at least 10% of the total asset in the same fiscal year. The 
dependent variables are binary variables that equals to 1 if a firm is taking a big bath, and 0 otherwise. The  ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in the parentheses.  












Log (Market cap) -0.101 -0.151 -0.081 -0.059 -0.163 -0.182 
 (0.92) (0.17) (0.45) (0.64) (0.14) (0.12) 
Log (Firm age) 0.088 -0.042 0.224 0.172 -0.042 -0.048 
 (0.63) (0.82) (0.39) (0.52) (0.84) (0.83) 
Log (board size) -1.048 -1.131 -0.097 -1.601* 0.048 0.317 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.24) (0.07) (0.95) (0.68) 
Post 2001 period 0.139 0.309 0.183 0.298 -0.114 -0.052 
 (0.65) (0.33) (0.56) (0.42) (0.73) (0.85) 
Firm risk 23.320*** 19.140** 21.270*** 22.950*** 12.470 13.270 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.23) 




-0.163 0.153 -0.600* -1.110* 
 (0.43) (0.19) (0.66) (0.76) (0.06) (0.02) 
R&D intensity 4.884** -1.446 3.956** 15.850*** 2.830 3.892 
 (0.02) (0.81) (0.04) (0.00) (0.27) (0.43) 
Free Cash Flow 3.071*** 4.824* 1.141 3.041** 4.881*** 5.736* 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.30) (0.03) (0.00) (0.06) 
Unexpected -0.057 -0.199 -0.063 -1.131** -0.829** -0.248 
 (0.85) (0.68) (0.86) (0.02) (0.02) (0.65) 
Outside director connections 0.022 0.056 -0.073** -0.039 -0.009 0.005 
 (0.35) (0.12) (0.03) (0.55) (0.67) (0.86) 
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Unexpected*  -0.106**  -0.011  -0.062 
  Outside director connection  (0.03)  (0.87)  (0.37) 
       
Unexpected*  -1.512**  -1.721**  0.498 




 (0.02)  (0.54) 
       
Free cash flow *  0.177  3.561  0.151 




 (0.16)  (0.97) 
       
Free cash flow *  11.780**  -8.455  5.106 
 Outside director connection  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.25) 
       
       
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations 282 282 283 283 254 254 
Pseudo R-sq 0.193 0.303 0.266 0.347 0.208 0.233 
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Table 18 Comparison of changes in stock and firm Performance around unexpected 
CEO departures based on inside director presence 
This table shows the univariate results of changes in stock and firm performance after an 
unexpected CEO departure. Panel A shows the comparison of market reaction 
(cumulative abnormal returns) at the announcement of the incumbent CEO departure. 
The CARs are computed in Eventus using market model. Panel B shows the comparison 
of firm performance. I calculate both unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROAs (not 
tabulated, but available by request), as well as industry-and-performance adjusted ROAs. 
***, **, and * indicate that the mean is significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level. Bolded letters c, b, and a indicate a two-sided t-test for mean differences between 
no non-CEO inside director and at least one non-CEO inside director subsamples are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. t-stats are in the parentheses. Definitions of all 
variables are in the Appendix. Changes in performance are winsorized at 1%.  










between (1) and 
(2) (t-stat) 
CAR (0,0) -1.22%** -1.20%
 
-0.83%  (-1.15) 
CAR (-1,1) -2.28%*** -1.59%
 
-2.18%  (-1.55) 
CAR (-3,3) -2.75%*** -2.73%*
 
-0.37%  (-0.24) 











between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 
ROAt-1 13.64%*** 11.18%*** 3.44%
a
  (2.47) 














  (1.75) 
Indperf_adj ROAt-1 -0.11% 0.21%
 
-0.32% (-1.60) 
Change in indperf_adj ROAt+1 2.75%** 4.50%* -1.77%  (-0.68) 











  (1.69) 










between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 
% Firms Taking Big batht-1 2.63% 8.69% -6.06%  (-1.50) 
% Firms Taking Big batht+1 2.94% 13.63% -10.70%
a
  (-2.17) 
100 
 










between (1) and 
(2)  (t-stat) 












Table 19 Multivariate analysis: Change in firm performance around unexpected CEO departures 
This table shows the estimate of OLS regressions of changes in firm operating performance from one year before to three 
years after the unexpected CEO departure announcement. It only contains firms with at least three consecutive years of 
operation after the incumbent CEO departure. The dependent variables are changes in industry-and-performance adjusted 
ROAs. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in the 
parentheses.  Definitions of all variables are in the Appendix. Changes in performance are winsorized at 1%. 
 
 Change in performance one year before to up to three years after the unexpected departure 






























Log (Market cap) -0.007 -0.011 -0.000 -0.007 0.015 0.010 
 (0.64) (0.46) (0.98) (0.68) (0.24) (0.36) 
Log (Firm age) -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.022 0.013 0.001 
 (0.95) (0.50) (0.87) (0.35) (0.48) (0.97) 
Log (board size) 0.030 0.041 0.001 0.022 -0.059 -0.028 
 (0.68) (0.59) (0.99) (0.81) (0.37) (0.58) 
Founder CEO 0.129 0.105 0.071 0.036 0.066 0.043 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.61) (0.76) (0.36) (0.52) 
Post 2001 period -0.026 -0.042 -0.003 -0.028 -0.010 -0.025 
 (0.49) (0.26) (0.95) (0.54) (0.78) (0.39) 
Firm risk 1.534 1.823 -0.086 0.491 1.234 1.116 
 (0.48) (0.41) (0.96) (0.80) (0.54) (0.58) 
Log (New CEO age) -0.133 -0.179** -0.161 -0.230* -0.080 -0.141** 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) 
Log (Delay) -0.001 0.003 -0.014 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 






Table 19 continued  


































0.077* 0.082* 0.097*** 0.089* 
 (0.27) (0.99) (0.10) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) 
Outside director connections 0.001 0.009** -0.000 0.014*** 0.001 0.011*** 
 (0.80) (0.01) (0.93) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) 
R&D intensity -0.414 0.002 -0.870 1.418 -1.175* -0.321 
 (0.56) (0.99) (0.42) (0.14) (0.06) (0.52) 
       
R&D intensity *  1.339*  1.857**  1.068** 




 (0.03)  (0.05) 
       
R&D intensity *  -0.132**  -0.200**  -0.191*** 




 (0.04)  (0.00) 
       
Constant and industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other control variables 
a 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations 98 98 98 98 89 89 
R-sq 0.138 0.251 0.122 0.286 0.345 0.547 





While CEO succession planning has received a lot of attention recently—
particularly in social media, there has been a dearth of studies evaluating its necessity. 
Moreover, the succession planning process itself has not been clearly described, possibly 
because this process is difficult to observe and evaluate. In this dissertation, I determine 
whether CEO succession planning matters and I examine which actions board of directors 
take to prepare for a succession in the company’s top executive leadership. I also 
investigate whether certain board composition help firms weather the storm better when 
their CEO suddenly departs. I find that when the CEO departure is planned, firms tend to 
experience less negative excess stock returns, more favorable change in firm 
performance, as well as continued capital expenditures. In addition, firms with both 
inside directors other than the CEO and well-connected outside directors are most 
resilient, whereas firms with neither non-CEO inside directors nor connected outside 
directors are least resilient and suffer the most. In addition, firms with greater inside 
director presence are less likely to engage in big bath accounting, i.e., taking advantage of 
the departure to largely write off assets. This paper contributes to the CEO succession 
planning literature by showing that longer lead time in CEO succession planning is 
critical to lower disruption costs and ensure a smoother transition. Thus, the new SEC 
requirement that CEO succession planning be fully elevated to the status of core board 
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